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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Deal innovations in mergers and acquisitions have occupied a prominent place in finance 
research. The importance of understanding the efficacy of new deal-making devices and 
identifying the beneficiaries of such deal provisions has attracted the attention of researchers. 
Prior research in this area has focused on deal protection devices, such as termination fee 
provisions and lockup options (see e.g. Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Burch, 2001; Officer, 2003).  
Along with the private equity boom in the mid-2000s emerged a new M&A deal 
technology – the “go-shop” provision. This newly invented provision allows the target firm to 
actively solicit superior offers after an initial merger agreement is signed with the initial bidder. 
As the go-shop provision was used in some recent prominent merger deals such as Lear, Topps, 
J.Crew, and Dell, it has attracted much attention from the practitioners and academics in law. 
However, despite the ongoing debate on the use of go-shop provisions in corporate takeover 
activities, we still do not know the effectiveness of this relatively new deal-making device or 
who truly benefits from these provisions. While researchers have discussed the impact of go-
shop provisions from the legal perspective (Bloch, 2010; Denton, 2008; Morrel, 2008; Sautter, 
2008; Subramanian, 2008), most of these studies are qualitative, use a small sample of go-shop 
deals, conduct mostly univariate analyses, and do not reach an agreement on the effectiveness of 
go-shop provisions in merger agreements. Subramanian (2008) also examines target firms’ stock 
price reaction to acquisition announcements in go-shop deals.
1
 To advance our understanding of 
the overall wealth effects of go-shop provisions in corporate acquisitions, it is important to shed 
light on the impact of go-shop provisions on the wealth of targets and bidders, and thereby 
                                                          
1
 Recent working papers by Jeon and Lee (2013) and Antoniades, Calomiris, and Hitscherich (2013) also examine 
target stock price reaction to acquisition announcements for go-shop deals. 
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provide evidence on the synergies associated with such deal provisions. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first study to do so.  
I also provide evidence on how go-shop provisions affect the initial acquirer’s bidding 
behavior. Previous literature almost exclusively focuses on the impact of go-shop provisions on 
the target in soliciting superior offers from potential buyers, but overlooks the possibility that the 
inclusion of go-shop provisions in merger agreements may exert influence on initial bidders as 
well. Arguably, the initial bidder has the incentive to protect the deal in which it has invested a 
substantial amount of time, money, and due diligence effort. This study examines how the use of 
go-shop provisions influences the initial bidder in the post-signing period. In this context, I 
document how initial bidders react to the inclusion of go-shop provisions and identify the go-
shop deal characteristics that influence the initial bidders. 
A detailed examination of hand-collected go-shop deal parameters allows me to identify 
which characteristics are important in determining the wealth effects to the deal participants and 
deal outcomes. These go-shop characteristics include the length of the go-shop period, the 
number of potential buyers contacted during the go-shop period, the number of confidentiality 
agreements between the target firm and potential buyers, and the presence of a bifurcated 
termination fee structure. Subramanian (2008) is the only study that examines these go-shop deal 
characteristics in a univariate setting for a relatively small sample of 48 go-shop transactions. 
Using a multivariate setting, my study sheds light on the usefulness and efficacy of these go-shop 
characteristics, as well as additional deal and target characteristics, on deal outcomes.  
My primary focus in this paper is the impact of go-shop provisions on deal outcomes and 
I address the issue of whether go-shop provisions are utilized by target managers to pursue 
private benefits or are used to protect the fiduciary interests of the target shareholder. To this end, 
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I investigate the effectiveness of go-shop provisions by empirically testing a series of hypotheses 
following two competing theories: (a) the window-dressing theory, and (b) the shareholder 
interest theory. 
The results indicate that go-shop provisions generally have significantly higher positive 
wealth effect on the targets as compared to no-shop deals, but the bidders’ wealth effect is 
similar to no-shop transactions. However, go-shop deals are associated with substantially higher 
deal synergies. I also document that the inclusion of go-shop provisions in merger agreements 
affects the initial bidders’ behavior in the post-signing period. Specifically, bidders under merger 
agreements with go-shop provisions are more likely to raise their initial bid offers. This suggests 
that go-shop provisions allow target firms to exert pressure on the initial bidders to obtain a 
better price on behalf of the target shareholders. Thus, go-shop provisions can be used as a 
bargaining device against the initial bidders. I also find that go-shop deals are significantly more 
likely to be terminated compared to no-shop deals. Go-shop deal characteristics are important 
determinants of the outcome of the deals. Specifically, the market seems to react positively to the 
bifurcated fee structure in go-shop provisions. The number of potential buyers contacted and the 
number of confidentiality agreements entered during the go-shop period play an important role in 
pressuring the initial bidder to raise the original offer price, while the length of go-shop period 
and the number of confidentiality agreements signed predict the initial bid success rate. This 
study controls for a variety of important firm and deal characteristics, as well as target firm 
governance quality but prior literature is mostly silent on this dimension. Heckman two-stage 
procedure and propensity score matching method are employed in this research to mitigate 
endogeneity concerns. The results are confirmed by these robustness checks. 
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1.2. Organization of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 I provide detailed 
background information of go-shop provisions and review literature on related topics. Chapter 3 
introduces the two hypotheses regarding the use of go-shop provisions: the window-dressing 
hypothesis and shareholder interest hypothesis. In Chapter 4 I describe my data and sample 
selection process. Empirical findings are presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 concludes. 
Appendices and tables are included at the end of the dissertation. 
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Chapter 2: Go-Shop Provisions 
2.1. How Do Go-Shop Provisions Work? 
Go-shop provisions allow the target firm to shop for better offers from potential buyers 
after a merger agreement is signed with the initial bidder. This provision contrasts the traditional 
“no-shop” clause which prohibits target firms from soliciting superior offers or negotiating with 
potential buyers once a merger agreement is entered by both the target and the bidder, unless the 
target receives unsolicited offers that are deemed to benefit the target shareholders more than the 
original offer. In go-shop deals, target firms have the right to actively solicit better offers during 
the so-called go-shop period and may exchange confidential information with a potential bidder 
as long as the potential bidder signs a confidentiality agreement that is equivalent to the one 
signed by the initial bidder. After the go-shop period expires, the target is subject to the 
traditional no-shop clause. A potential buyer who has shown interest and submitted a proposal 
during the go-shop period is usually allowed to continue the negotiation with the target after the 
expiration of the go-shop period.  
A prominent recent go-shop deal is Dell’s $24.4 billion going-private buyout proposed by 
Michael Dell, the Founder, Chairman, and CEO of the computer giant. Dell announced on 
February 5
th
, 2013 that it had signed a definitive merger agreement under which Mr. Michael 
Dell, partnered with private equity firm Silver Lake Partners, will acquire the third largest PC 
maker in the world and take it private. The deal agreement contained a 45-day go-shop period 
during which Dell’s board of directors can freely contact and solicit other buyers. Promptly 
following the announcement of the deal, Evercore Partners, one of Dell’s financial advisors, 
began the go-shop process on behalf of the company at the direction and under the supervision of 
the Special Committee. During the 45-day go-shop period, Evercore contacted a total of 67 
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parties to solicit interest in pursuing a possible transaction. On March 22
nd
, 2013, the last day of 
the go-shop period, Blackstone Group and billionaire activist investor Carl Icahn submitted their 
competing bids. However, both Blackstone and Mr. Icahn subsequently backed out of the rival 
bid. The change-of-control transaction was completed on October 29
th
, 2013. 
The 1986 landmark decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. rules that in a sale-of-control transaction, the singular 
responsibility of the target board of directors is to maximize the wealth of the target shareholders 
from the sale. In compliance with the Revlon standard, courts evaluate the adequacy of the 
decision-making process employed by the target board and examine the reasonableness of the 
target board’s action in light of the circumstances. Dealmakers have primarily relied on pre-
signing public auctions in an effort to obtain the highest possible price for the target stockholders. 
A pre-signing market check allows the target firm to discover the highest price available in the 
market and therefore it has been regarded as the most efficient way to achieve the target 
shareholder value maximization objective. Since the bidder has invested a substantial amount of 
time and resources upfront in conducting the due diligence research in identifying and evaluating 
the target firm, the bidder in the traditional auction process has the motivation to lock down deals 
that have been made. Consequently, a no-shop or no-talk provision, which provides the bidders 
with a deal protection, has been commonly used in merger agreements along with other deal 
protection devices such as termination fees. In situations where the target firm has little or 
virtually no pre-signing market check, the board of the target firm is expected to conduct an 
alternative post-signing market canvas (a fiduciary out or window-shop) so that the target 
shareholders could receive the highest bid price possibly available.  
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In recent years, the Delaware courts have held that a full-blown public auction is not 
necessarily a requirement for change of control transactions for all corporations under Delaware 
law. Delaware courts’ attitude on a firm’s sale process suggests that a pre-signing market check 
is no longer considered the only effective method for the target firm board to achieve the highest 
sales price possible on behalf of the target shareholders. Alternative sales processes are 
acceptable as long as there is evidence that the target board has fulfilled its fiduciary duties.  
The go-shop provision has become a popular and important deal-making device since 
2004. In contrast to traditional no-shop provisions, go-shop provisions give target firms an 
opportunity to lock in the initial sale price as the floor on the value of the company, while 
allowing the firm to actively solicit better offers during the go-shop period, which typically 
ranges from 30 to 50 days. The offer made by the initial bidder generates new information and 
may be used as a reference point for potential buyers, making the target more attractive and 
marketable. In case a superior offer emerges during the go-shop period and the target board 
decides to accept the superior offer price and terminate the original agreement, the target usually 
only needs to pay a reduced break-up fee, rather than the full amount, to the initial bidder.  
Although a public auction is believed by some to be the most efficient market canvass 
process, Boone and Mulherin (2007) use novel data to show that there is no significant difference 
between publicly auctioned deals and privately negotiated deals in the wealth effects for target 
shareholders. In addition, it may not always be feasible for the target to run a full-blown auction 
to extract the best possible price for the target shareholders before a definitive merger agreement 
is entered. A target firm may find a go-shop provision appealing when it is important to reach a 
deal quickly or when there would otherwise be a significant possibility of losing a seemingly 
attractive offer. For instance, Lear Corporation, a leading supplier of components to the 
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automotive industry, was approached by activist investor Carl Icahn in early 2007 with an 
interest of taking the company private. Mr. Icahn indicated that he would withdraw his offer if an 
auction occurred. At that time, no other potential buyers showed interest in a deal with Lear. As a 
result, Lear and Mr. Icahn entered into a merger agreement without a pre-signing auction or 
market check.  
Theoretically, the flexibility offered by go-shop provisions to solicit superior prices in the 
go-shop period is intended to encourage the target board to actively solicit competing bids from 
potential buyers. The target board can canvas the market and invite competing bids, if any, 
during the go-shop period. Because competition for a target is generally expected to result in a 
higher bid premium, the inclusion of a go-shop provision is perceived by some as good news. 
Besides, as suggested in Andersen (2008), go-shop provisions provide certainties to everyone as 
the initial deal is locked in without the risk to value or reputation that could result from a failed 
deal or a public auction. In the meantime, the go-shop provision provides the initial bidder with 
the advantage of pre-signing exclusivity. A one-on-one negotiation in the pre-announcement 
period helps the bidder avoid the risk of spending a significant amount of time and money in the 
auction process without a guaranteed outcome. Further, this exclusivity allows the bidder to 
close a deal much faster than if it has to compete in a public auction. Therefore, some previous 
studies argue that both the target and the acquirer can benefit from the go-shop provision (Bloch, 
2010; Subramanian, 2008). 
Nevertheless, there are different voices about the go-shop provision as an effective 
market check device that increases target shareholder value (Sautter, 2008). The questions and 
doubts regarding the effectiveness of the go-shop provision are based on the observed low 
likelihood of the initial offer getting “jumped” during the go-shop period following the initial 
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announcement. Critics argue that because of the bidder’s management retention policy and 
generous offer to the target’s management team, the target manager may intend to sell the 
company to one particular bidder only, making the go-shop provision a “window dressing” 
practice that may not be beneficial to the target shareholders. In addition, many of the go-shop 
deals involve private equity firms and it is believed that private firms are not likely to challenge 
other private firms’ deals (the “gentlemen’s agreement” between private equity firms), as noted 
in Houtman and Morton (2007). The go-shop periods are also claimed to be too short for 
potential buyers to conduct sufficient due diligence and propose competing bids. Moreover, go-
shop provisions may come with clauses that restrict particular buyers from entering bids or give 
the initial bidder matching rights. Such deal protections in the initial merger agreements may 
deter third party bidders from making competing offers.  
2.2. Literature Review 
Several law studies discuss the role played by go-shop provisions in M&A deals since the 
emergence of the go-shop provision in the mid-2000s. Subramanian (2008) is the first empirical 
paper examining the effects of the go-shop provision. Using a sample of 48 go-shop deals in 
2006 and 2007, Subramanian (2008) finds that go-shop deals yield more search than no-shop 
deals and target shareholders receive approximately 5% higher returns in pure go-shop deals than 
in no-shop deals. He concludes that the inclusion of a go-shop provision in a transaction on 
average benefits the target shareholders and may even lead to a “win-win” situation where the 
target firm gains from actively soliciting superior offers in the post-signing period while the 
bidder enjoys the highly valued exclusivity in the transaction. In the meantime, however, he 
warns that although the use of go-shop provisions allows the target board to fulfill its fiduciary 
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duties, a go-shop provision may not be beneficial to the target shareholders in management 
buyouts (MBOs).  
Bloch (2010) echoes Subramanian (2008) and argues that with a go-shop provision, the 
target has the option to lock in a floor value of the company while still being allowed to pursue 
better prices, and the bidder is provided with the highly valued exclusivity. Bloch (2010) also 
notes that the effectiveness of a go-shop provision depends on the deal protection mechanisms, 
the management involvement, how much effort the target board puts in soliciting superior offers, 
and whether the potential bidders are provided a legitimate opportunity to conduct due diligence 
and propose an alternative offer. Highlighting possible legal pitfalls that may arise from using 
go-shop provisions in acquisitions, Morrel (2008) points out that while go-shop provisions can 
be used to fulfill target boards’ fiduciary duties to obtain the best offer on behalf of target 
shareholders, target boards must utilize go-shop provisions in an effort to maximize target 
shareholder wealth.  
Sautter (2008) criticizes the Delaware courts’ support for post-signing market checks and 
contends that the go-shop provision is not a device that maximizes the wealth of target 
shareholders. In a recent working paper, Jeon and Lee (2013) find higher deal premiums and 
more competing bids in go-shop deals. Their findings generally support the proposition that go-
shop provisions reflect target manager’s effort to fulfill the Revlon duties. Another recent 
working paper by Antoniades, Calomiris, and Hitscherich (2013) uses a sample of 306 cash deals 
to study the decision of adopting go-shop provisions in merger agreements and consider potential 
conflicts of interest and litigation risks. They argue that the go-shop option is not free by 
showing that target firms in go-shop deals receive lower initial premiums. The authors find a 
small but statistically insignificant improvement in attracting post-agreement bidders in go-shop 
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deals. Their theoretical framework has an ambiguous prediction about the effects of go-shop 
choice on target firm valuation. Evidence on the effects of go-shop provisions in existing 
literature remains inconclusive. 
This research is closely related to studies in deal protection devices such as termination 
fee provisions, toeholds, and lockup options. A considerable amount of attention has been given 
to research in this field (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Burch, 2001; 
Officer, 2003). Termination fee provisions are included in M&A deals to require the target firm 
to pay a break-up fee to the bidder to compensate its labor, time, and expenses spent in the due 
diligence, in case the deal is not consummated. The findings in Bates and Lemmon (2003) and 
Officer (2003) show that the termination fees are at least not harmful, and are likely beneficial, to 
target shareholders. Betton and Eckbo (2000) find that pre-bid ownership of target shares reduces 
the likelihood of competition and target resistance and are associated with lower bid premiums. 
Another paper in the same vein as my study is Burch (2001). Burch (2001) examines the impact 
of lockup options granted to bidders and finds that although lockups serve as a competition 
deterrent for target firms, the lockup provision is associated with significantly higher returns to 
target shareholders. Burch (2001) concludes that managers use lockup options to enhance 
bargaining power rather than harm the shareholders.  
In a recent study by Boone and Mulherin (2007), the authors use a novel dataset to show 
that there is active takeover competition in the pre-announcement period and find that the wealth 
effects for target shareholders are comparable in auctions and negotiations. Since the use of go-
shop provisions is generally associated with private negotiation with particular single bidders 
while no-shop deals usually involve active auction processes, this research on the effectiveness 
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of the go-shop provisions from another angle empirically tests the conclusion in Boone and 
Mulherin (2007). 
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Chapter 3: Hypotheses Development 
Practitioners and researchers alike have been rigorously discussing the effectiveness of 
the go-shop provision in protecting the interests of the target shareholders since the emergence of 
this new deal technology in the mid-2000s. “Success or failure in negotiating the terms of a go-
shop clause can mean the difference between maximizing the sale price and protecting your 
senior management and board – or not,” cautions Nicholas Unkovic, a partner at Squire, Sanders 
& Dempsey L.L.P. Consistent with this practical view on the effectiveness of go-shop provisions, 
previous law papers on the use of go-shop provisions argue that although this provision may be 
used as an effective market canvas device, target management incentives are an important 
determinant of the deal outcomes (see Bloch, 2010; Denton, 2008; Houtman and Morton, 2007; 
Morrel, 2008; Sautter, 2008; Subramanian, 2008). In line with both the professional and 
theoretical perspectives, I examine the effects of go-shop provisions in the context of two 
competing theories: the “window-dressing” theory and the “shareholder interest” theory.  
The core of the window-dressing theory is agency conflicts. The agency conflicts 
between the shareholders and managers have received considerable interest in previous literature 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). Divergence of managers’ interests from owners’ 
objectives gives rise to agency problems. In the context of corporate mergers and acquisitions, 
the target manager may agree to a merger in pursuit of private benefits, such as a secured future 
position in the surviving company, even when the buyer’s offer may not be the highest offer 
price available to the target firm (Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack, 2004).
2
 The window-dressing 
theory assumes that in go-shop deals, the target manager acts in his own interests and makes the 
decision to sell the target firm to a particular bidder without a full-blown market check in 
                                                          
2
 It should be noted that neither Martin and McConnell (1991) nor Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) find a 
negative relation between target shareholder gains and incumbent manager retention in the merged firm. 
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exchange for private benefits. Due to these potential private benefits, the management of the 
target firm may not have the incentive to run an efficient market canvas in the post-signing 
period since it has already decided whom it will sell the firm to. A particular bidder may be 
hand-selected because it promises the most private benefits to the manager of the target firm but 
not because the bidder offers a purchase price that maximizes the target shareholder wealth.  
Since the Delaware Court’s decision in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc. requires the target board of directors to make its best effort to obtain the highest price 
possible on behalf of the target shareholders in the sale of the company, the management of the 
target firm may be subject to litigations for failing to fulfill its fiduciary duty. As a result, the 
inclusion of a go-shop provision may be used merely as a window-dressing practice that provides 
the target board with legal protection in case of shareholder litigations (Bloch, 2010). In a recent 
study, Webb (2013) finds that the presence of go-shop provisions is negatively associated with 
institutional lead plaintiffs, suggesting that go-shop provisions could be used to mitigate 
litigation risks. 
In contrast, the shareholder interest theory presumes that target management acts in the 
best interests of target shareholders in change-of-control transactions. In situations where the 
target firm has limited pre-signing market check, if the target board determines that the initial bid 
offer is meaningful and attractive, it may accept the initial bidder’s offer as a floor price and 
insist that a go-shop provision be included in the merger agreement so that the target firm can 
conduct a post-signing market canvas and actively solicit better prices from potential buyers on 
behalf of the target shareholders. If a competing bid emerges during the go-shop period and is 
deemed to be a superior offer, the target firm will accept it and terminate the initial deal by 
paying a (reduced) termination fee to the initial bidder. This way, the board of directors of the 
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target firm fulfills its fiduciary duties by thoroughly checking the market in the post-signing 
period and obtaining the highest price available to the target shareholders.  
To shed light on the effectiveness of go-shop provisions, I investigate the effects of this 
new deal innovation on the wealth of deal participants (bidder and target), the behavior of the 
initial bidder, and deal outcomes. Following the window-dressing theory and the shareholder 
interest theory, I develop hypotheses in each of these aspects of interest.  
3.1. Wealth Effect Hypotheses 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement date are an important 
measure of wealth effects in M&A literature. Unlike previous literature that only examine the 
market reactions to target stock prices (Antoniades, Calomiris, and Hitscherich, 2013; Jeon and 
Lee, 2013; Subramanian, 2008), this study provides complete analyses of the wealth effects of 
go-shop provisions not only for the target, but also for the bidder as well as the synergy created 
by the transaction. The window-dressing theory implies that the go-shop provision is used by the 
target management as a mechanism to expropriate wealth from the target shareholders. If this is 
true, the market should view the go-shop provision as bad news and therefore should react 
negatively to the announcements of go-shop deals compared with no-shop deals. However, if the 
go-shop provision is an effective market canvas device for the target board to obtain the highest 
bid price for the target shareholders, the market reaction for target firms in go-shop deals should 
be at least at par with that for no-shop deals. The above discussion leads me to propose the 
following alternative hypotheses: 
H1a: Target firms in go-shop deals receive lower CARs compared with target firms in 
no-shop deals. 
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H1b: Target firms in go-shop deals receive CARs that are no lower than target CARs in 
no-shop deals. 
As the other party involved in the deal, the bidder is likely to be able to purchase the 
target firm at a discounted price if the go-shop provision is abused by target managers to pursue 
private benefits. The lower acquisition premium paid by the bidder in go-shop deals should be 
accompanied by positive bidder stock price reactions. On the other hand, under the shareholder 
interest theory where bidders pay fair premiums to target firms whose management actively 
solicits the highest price available for the target shareholders, bidders’ stock price reactions 
should be no different between go-shop and no-shop deals. This discussion leads me to propose 
the following hypotheses: 
H2a: Bidders in go-shop deals receive higher CARs compared with bidders in no-shop 
deals. 
H2b: Bidders in go-shop deals receive no higher CARs compared with bidders in no-
shop deals. 
Examining the wealth effect of both the target and the bidder allows me to take a step 
further to investigate the synergy created by the target and the bidder and answer the question 
how go-shop provisions affect the overall value generated in change-of-control transactions. The 
synergy created between the target and the bidder is dependent on the CARs of the target and the 
bidder as well as the relative size of the deal participants (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988; Wang 
and Xie, 2009).  
In analyzing the wealth effects of go-shop provisions, I also consider the premiums paid 
to the target shareholders. According to the window-dressing theory, the management of the 
target firm may have the incentive to sell the target firm at a discounted price to a particular 
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bidder in exchange for private benefits from the bidder. Therefore, according to the window-
dressing theory, the premiums paid to the targets in go-shop deals should be lower than those in 
no-shop deals. On the other hand, as suggested by the shareholder interest theory, if the target 
management strives to obtain the highest price available to the target shareholder, the initial 
bidder has the incentive to prevent the initial bid from being competed since it has already put in 
a substantial amount of time, money, and effort in identifying the target and entering into an 
agreement with the target. As a result, the initial bidder may offer a reasonable amount of 
premium to the target firm upfront to fend off potential competition during the go-shop period. 
The above discussion leads me to propose the following hypotheses: 
H3a: Target firms in go-shop deals receive lower premiums than in no-shop deals. 
H3b: Target firms in go-shop deals receive premiums that are no lower than in no-shop 
deals. 
3.2. Initial Bidder Behavior Hypotheses 
The implications of go-shop provisions to bidders remain undocumented in the previous 
literature. I examine the initial bidder behavior in go-shop deals. If target managers use the go-
shop provision as a window-dressing device, then they will not have any incentive to solicit 
superior offers. Consequently, the initial bidder will not feel threatened by the go-shop provision 
and therefore will not consider it necessary to raise the initial offer to protect the deal. On the 
other hand, if the go-shop provisions are, in fact, utilized by shareholder-friendly target boards to 
solicit better prices in the post-signing period, the use of this provision should exert pressure on 
the initial bidder to raise the original offer price to protect the deal. Based on the above reasoning, 
I propose the following two alternative hypotheses:  
H4a: Initial bidders in go-shop deals are unlikely to raise the original offer prices. 
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H4b: Initial bidders in go-shop deals are more likely to raise the original offer prices. 
3.3. Deal Outcome Hypotheses 
Given the “extended shopping hours,” target firms in go-shop deals have the opportunity 
to check the availability of superior prices in the market and collect information and feedback 
regarding the value of the target firms from the potential buyers solicited. The intended purpose 
of the go-shop provision is for the target firm to find potential competing bids, if any, in the post-
signing period and terminate the original deal if deemed necessary. I empirically examine the 
impact of the target firm’s option to actively solicit better offers in the post-signing period on 
deal outcomes, specifically, the initial bid success rate and the post-bid competition.  
Based on the window-dressing theory, if a private deal is made between the target 
management and one particular bidder, the initial deal is more likely to be completed. Therefore, 
the initial deal success rate in go-shop deals should be higher than in no-shop deals. Additionally, 
since the target management does not have the incentive to solicit better prices, go-shop 
provisions may not receive more competing bids compared to no-shop deals as one may expect. 
The target shareholder theory, on the other hand, suggests that if go-shop provisions are included 
in merger agreements to maximize the target shareholders’ wealth in change-of-control 
transactions, they should affect deal outcomes differently. Specifically, if the target board makes 
its best effort to find superior prices in the market and collects information regarding the 
valuation and future prospect of the firm from the market during the go-shop period, the 
termination rate of initial bids in go-shop provisions should be higher.
3
 Besides, in situations 
where the target firm has limited opportunities to canvas the market prior to the initial bid 
agreement, more competing bids should emerge during the post-bid period in go-shop deals than 
                                                          
3
 The frequently observed bifurcated (reduced) termination fee structure in go-shop deals would also encourage 
termination of the original bid. 
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in no-shop deals, assuming the target board acts in the best interest of the target shareholders. 
The above discussion leads to the following two sets of alternative hypotheses related to initial 
bid success rate and competing bids: 
H5a: Go-shop deals have higher initial bid success rate compared with no-shop deals. 
H5b: Go-shop deals have similar or lower initial bid success rate compared with no-shop 
deals. 
H6a: Go-shop deals do not induce more competing bids than no-shop deals. 
H6b: Go-shop deals induce more competing bids than no-shop deals. 
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Chapter 4: Data, Sample Formation, and Descriptive Statistics 
M&A data are collected from Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Platinum Mergers and 
Acquisitions database for the period between January 1st, 2004 and December 31st, 2012. The 
status of a deal is either “completed” or “withdrawn”. I require deal values to be available in 
SDC and greater than 1 million US dollars. I exclude all transactions labeled as spinoffs, recaps, 
self-tenders, exchange offers, repurchases, minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining 
interest, or privatizations (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz and Zutter, 2008). A deal is dropped 
out of the sample if the acquirer owned more than 50% of the target firm prior to the transaction. 
Target firms are public firms which have non-missing stock price data reported by the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) during the three days surrounding the announcement date of 
a deal and accounting data reported in Compustat for the fiscal year immediately preceding the 
announcement date.  
Go-shop deals are identified in the SDC database. The sample period starts in 2004 
because the first go-shop deal in this database is recorded in that year. To verify accuracy, I read 
through SEC filings to identify go-shop deals. I found a total of 203 deals with this provision 
during the sample period.
4
 Detailed go-shop deal information, such as the length of go-shop 
periods, number of potential buyers solicited during the go-shop period, the number of 
confidentiality agreements entered between the target and potential buyers during the go-shop 
period, and the presence of a bifurcated termination fee arrangement, is obtained from the SEC 
filings in EDGAR database or from online resources such as Lexis-Nexis and Google search, 
                                                          
4
 Datasets obtained from SDC prior to February 2013 included 242 go-shop deals with US targets in the sample for 
the period between 2004 and 2012. However, due to a clean-up process conducted by Thomson Reuters in March 
2013, the number of go-shop deals in SDC dropped down to 174 for the same period of time. 
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supplemented by a go-shop deal report prepared by Potter Anderson & Corroon, LLP.
5
 An 
example of the language used in a go-shop deal is contained in Appendix A. My final sample 
consists of 1,963 M&A deals, among which 137 are go-shop deals. 
Several law papers have discussed the motivation of the management and boards that 
include go-shop provisions in merger agreements. Some argue that it is possible that target 
boards use go-shop provisions as a legal protection in case of shareholder litigations (Bloch, 
2010; Sautter, 2008; Webber, 2013). In the meantime, a high quality board which acts in the best 
interest of target shareholders may adopt this provision to maximize the wealth of target 
shareholders in case a superior offer price emerges. Either way, it is critical to consider 
management incentives and board monitoring and advising quality in change-of-control activities 
when studying the effects of go-shop provisions. Therefore, in this study I control for target 
board characteristics which are absent from existing research on go-shop provisions. 
For management incentives, I use an indicator variable to represent management buyout 
deals (MBO) obtained from SDC. The direct involvement of the management in a buyout offers 
the manager incentives to pay the lowest possible price. In the recent Dell going private deal, the 
founder of Dell, Mr. Michael Dell, is one of the major parties involved in the $24.4 billion 
purchase, and his initial offer price of $13.65 per share was deemed to be too low, which agitated 
the shareholders of the company.
6
 To control for board quality, I employ corporate governance 
measures such as target board size, the percentage of outside directors on the board, CEO duality, 
and board busyness (see Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1997; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; 
                                                          
5
A copy of the Potter Anderson & Corroon, LLP report on go-shop deals can be accessed at 
http://www.lawseminars.com/materials/07MACA/maca%20m%20morton%2008-23.pdf 
6
 In a recent lesser-known management buyout transaction, the Weiss family, the founding family of the American 
Greetings Corporation, offered to buy the second largest paper card maker for $17.18 per share. The announcement 
of the initial offer price set off shareholder outrage. The special committee and institutional investors negotiated 
vigorously over the price. The founding family was pressured to raise the bid price up to $19 per share, which 
allowed the deal to go through. 
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Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Yermack, 1996). These governance 
quality measures are captured using data from BoardEx Management Diagnostics Limited. 
BoardEx database is a private corporate research company that collects information on the board 
of directors and senior management. 
I also control for standard firm characteristics in the M&A literature. M/B is the target 
market value of assets over book value of assets. Leverage is the target’s long-term and current 
liabilities divided by total assets. Ln(market cap) is the natural log of a target’s market value of 
equity computed 42 trading days prior to the deal announcement. I use the variable run-up, 
calculated as the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from 252 days prior to the bid 
announcement to 6 days prior to the bid announcement, to capture the target previous 
performance and information leak before the announcement (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, 
and Zutter, 2008; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007). 
I note that in order to have a fair comparison between go-shop and no-shop deals and 
circumvent noise in subsequent bids, I examine the initial bids only and exclude follow-up bids 
from the sample. I only focus on initial deals because go-shop provisions are much more likely 
to appear in the initial deals than in competing bids (137 vs. 6). Further, in order to submit a 
competing offer proposal, the subsequent bidder generally needs to offer a premium higher than 
the original offer. In other words, the premiums in competing bids are conditional on the initial 
offer. Since the primary focus is on initial bids due to the clustering of go-shop deals in initial 
bids, I believe that it is better to compare premiums among initial bids. For the same reason, 
using only initial deals provides a cleaner setting when I examine the impact of go-shop 
provisions on the behavior of initial bidders and deal outcomes. 
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Table 1, Panel A describes the trend of the use of go-shop provisions in merger 
agreements over the period from 2004 to 2012. The use of go-shop provisions gained popularity 
during the mid-2000s private equity boom. Despite the decline in use in the late 2000s, the 
provision has been included in an increasing number of deals in recent years. In 2012, the last 
year of observation in my study, more than 13% of merger agreements contained go-shop 
provisions. Throughout the study period, on average about 7% deals included go-shop provisions 
in the agreements.  
[ Table 1 here ] 
Table 1, Panel B contains descriptive statistics for deal and target firm and board 
characteristics. Several deal and target characteristics are significantly different between the go-
shop and the no-shop samples. Target termination fees are more likely to be present in go-shop 
deals than in no-shop deals. The more frequent use of target termination fee provisions may 
indicate that the bidders in go-shop deals are particularly concerned about the completion of go-
shop deals because an effective target board will use the go-shop provision as a device to search 
for superior offers during the go-shop period. More than 80% of go-shop deals are financed by 
100% cash, compared with 58% incidence in no-shop deals. The high percentage of pure cash 
transactions in go-shop deals may be due to the fact that many go-shop deals involve private 
equity firms. While 6.6% of go-shop deal buyers possessed a toehold before the bid 
announcement, only 3.2% of no-shop buyers owned more than 5% of the target’s outstanding 
shares prior to the acquisitions. Public bidders tend to use no-shop provisions more than go-shop 
provisions, consistent with the finding in previous research that go-shop provisions appear often 
in deals with private equity involvement (Subramanian, 2008). Go-shop deal bidders are less 
likely to be in the same industry as the target defined by Fama-French 12 industry classifications. 
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Existing studies have shown that management involvement in M&A activities can give 
rise to severe agency problems, and it may affect the effectiveness of go-shop provisions 
(Hafzalla, 2009; Bloch, 2010; Perry and Williams, 1994; Subramanian, 2008). I use MBOs as a 
proxy for management incentives and agency conflict in this study (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Rice, 1984). The univariate analyses show that go-shop provisions are more frequently included 
in MBO deals. However, it is not clear at this point whether this provision is used by the target 
board to protect the target shareholders or is used to shield the self-interested management from 
potential litigations. A fiduciary-out provision in a merger agreement allows the target board of 
directors to terminate a deal if an unsolicited superior offer emerges. Some critics regard this 
provision as a passive form of fiduciary effort by the target board to protect the target 
shareholder’s interest (Sautter, 2008).7 I find that go-shop deals are more likely to be coupled 
with fiduciary-out provisions than no-shop deals. Firms with smaller sized boards are more likely 
to include go-shop provisions in their merger agreements. There is some evidence that CEO 
power, proxied by CEO duality, is associated with the use of go-shop provisions in merger 
agreements. Firms whose CEOs do not also hold the title of chairman of the board are more 
likely to install go-shop provisions in change-of-control transactions. The differences in 
characteristics between go-shop deals and no-shop deals are confirmed by Pearson correlations 
presented in Appendix C. 
Go-shop deal characteristics, which are believed to be closely related to the effectiveness 
of go-shop provisions in benefiting the target shareholders (Subramanian, 2008), are reported in 
Table 2. Panel A of the table shows the statistics of detailed go-shop deal characteristics, namely, 
                                                          
7
 A target firm may employ both go-shop provision and fiduciary-out provision in the merger agreement. For 
instance, the Topps merger agreement states “…, the terms of the merger agreement allow our Board to exercise its 
fiduciary duties to consider potential alternative transactions, including if it believes that an unsolicited acquisition 
proposal it receives after the conclusion of the go-shop period is reasonably expected to result in a superior 
proposal”. 
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the length of the go-shop period, the number of potential buyers solicited by the target firm 
during the go-shop period, the number of confidentiality agreements entered into between the 
target and potential buyers, and the presence of bifurcated termination fees.  
Under the shareholder interest theory which suggests that go-shop provisions are an 
effective post-signing market check device, the characteristics of go-shop deals should have 
significant impact on the outcome of deals. A longer go-shop period is generally preferred 
because it allows more time for the target board and its financial advisors to solicit potential 
buyers. The number of potential buyers contacted by the target board and the number of 
confidentiality agreements entered by the target and potential bidders during the go-shop period 
reflect the effort made by the target board searching for superior offers. Theoretically, the 
likelihood of obtaining a higher bid offer should increase in the number of potential buyers 
contacted and in the number of confidentiality agreements signed during the go-shop period. A 
majority of the go-shop deals contain a bifurcated termination fee structure, which permits the 
target firm to pay a reduced termination fee in case the deal is terminated by the target board 
during the go-shop provision. The bifurcated termination fee structure is supposed to encourage 
the target board to solicit better prices during the go-shop period. 
 The average length of go-shop periods is 36.126 days with a median of 37 days, 
consistent with the findings in previous research.
8
 A target board and its financial advisors on 
average solicit 51.87 potential buyers during the go-shop period and enter confidentiality 
agreements with 4.604 potential buyers who are interested in accessing the private information of 
the target firm. These numbers are higher than those reported in Subramanian (2008) due to the 
fact that the number of solicited buyers and confidentiality agreements signed kept growing over 
                                                          
8
 Subramanian (2008) reports an average go-shop period of 38.4 days and a median of 40 days, while Houtman and 
Morton (2007) document an average go-shop period of 33 days prior to 2007 and 42 days in the year of 2007. 
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the period between 2004 and 2012. 71.4% of the go-shop agreements contain bifurcated 
termination fee provisions, allowing the target to pay a reduced amount of breakup fee in case of 
a termination of the initial deal during the go-shop period. 
[ Table 2 here ] 
Panel B in Table 2 presents the Pearson correlations between the go-shop characteristics. 
The length of go-shop periods are positively related to the number of bidders solicited and the 
number of confidentiality agreements entered between the target and potential buyers. Deals with 
longer go-shop periods are also more likely to contain bifurcated termination fee provisions. 
Active solicitations are positively associated with the number of confidentiality agreements 
entered during the go-shop period. It should be noted that although theoretically both the number 
of potential buyers contacted and the number of confidentiality agreements entered are indicators 
of the target board’s effort of maximizing the target shareholders’ wealth, the number of 
confidentiality agreements may be a better and more accurate measure because the target board 
could contact many unsuitable bidders without getting any meaningful proposal or contact a few 
suitable bidders who are likely to submit superior offers. Potential bidders that enter into 
confidentiality agreements invest more time and effort into conducting due diligence than the 
“window shoppers” and therefore are more likely to challenge the initial deal.  
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Chapter 5: Empirical Findings 
5.1. Determinants of Go-Shop Provisions 
In this section, I consider various deal and target characteristics in an attempt to identify 
the determinants of go-shop provisions in merger agreements. In Table 3 Model 1, I present 
logistic regressions for the inclusion of go-shop provisions in merger agreements as a function of 
deal and target characteristics. The results in Model 1 indicate that the go-shop provisions and 
target termination fee provisions are positively correlated, which can be viewed as evidence that 
the initial bidder perceives the go-shop provision as a device that increases the likelihood of a 
termination of the initial merger agreement and therefore requires a termination fee provision in 
the agreement to protect the deal. Public bidders are less likely to use go-shop provisions in 
merger agreements, consistent with Subramanian (2008) who finds that private equity firms are 
frequently involved in go-shop deals. Go-shop provisions are less likely to be present in deals 
where targets and bidders from the same industry. There is some evidence that target firms with 
smaller boards of directors are more likely to include go-shop provisions in the merger 
agreements. I also find that the probability of including a go-shop provision in merger 
agreements is negatively correlated with the target firm’s market-to-book ratio.  
[ Table 3 here ] 
5.2. Addressing Potential Endogeneity 
As in any empirical finance studies, endogeneity issues are a potential concern. Firms 
choose whether to include go-shop provisions in merger agreements. It is possible that some 
unobservable factor that determines the choice of adopting go-shop provisions drives the effects 
of go-shop deals. Therefore, I attempt to address the endogeneity concern to draw conclusions on 
the causal effect of go-shop provisions on the wealth effect in mergers and acquisition deals. 
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According to Tucker (2010), Heckman two-step procedure is an appropriate method to address 
endogeneity problems where the selection bias is caused by unobservable factors. As a result, in 
examining the wealth effect of go-shop provisions, I report results of both OLS and Heckman 
two-step regressions in the paper. 
In the Heckman two-step regressions, the presence of a special committee is used as the 
instrumental variable for two reasons. First, Chapman and James (2008) point out the importance 
for boards of directors to address conflicts of interest in change-of-control transactions and that 
special committees of independent directors can be useful in ensuring that stockholders’ interests 
are protected in mergers and acquisitions. Secondly, Antoniades, Calomiris, and Hitscherich 
(2013) argues that the presence of special committees is a legitimate variable to capture 
exogenous variation in the go-shop decision because firms that employ special committees are 
more subject to lawyers conflicts of interest which make them litigation risk averse.
9
 From the 
legal perspective, forming a special committee is a signal that the board attempts to fulfill its 
fiduciary duty, consistent with the argument that the use of go-shop provisions mitigates 
litigation risks (Webber, 2013). As a result, the presence of a special committee may explain the 
choice of using go-shop provisions in merger agreements. 
Model 2 and Model 3 in Table 3 show that target firms that form special committees 
during the sales process are significantly more likely to include go-shop provisions in the merger 
agreements. In untabulated results, I find that the presence of special committees is not correlated 
with wealth effect variables, such as the announcement returns and premiums, which makes the 
                                                          
9
 Jeon and Lee (2013) employ the average proportion of go-shop deals in the target firm’s industry as the 
instrumental variable. Antoniades, Calomiris, and Hitscherich (2013) argue that it is not a valid go-shop instrument 
because industries experience changes over time in their riskiness and competitiveness, and these factors should be 
central to the determination of acquisition premiums. I attempted including the industry average go-shop deal 
proportion as an instrument. It does not change the results. 
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special committee dummy variable a valid instrumental variable in Heckman two-step 
regressions. 
5.3. Univariate Wealth Effects 
5.3.1. Target and Bidder Announcement Returns and Acquisition Synergies 
Market reactions around the announcement date are a popular measure of wealth effects 
in M&A literature. Previous empirical studies on go-shop provisions are limited to the target 
shareholder wealth effects but are silent on the bidder wealth effects and the total synergies 
generated by the deal. To further understand the wealth effects of go-shop provisions, I examine 
the announcement returns to the target and the bidder, as well as the deal synergies created as a 
result. I obtain the announcement dates of deals from the Securities Data Company (SDC). The 
target and bidder cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are measured from event day -1 to event 
day +1, where day 0 is the deal announcement date. CRSP value-weighted return is used as the 
market return to estimate the market model over a 200-day period ending 53 days prior to the 
deal announcement. I exclude deals with CARs less than -100% or greater than 200% to mitigate 
the effect of outliers (Officer, 2003). 
The calculation of acquisition synergies follows Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) and 
Wang and Xie (2009). For each deal, I form a value-weighted portfolio of the target and the 
bidder based on their market capitalizations 42 days prior to the announcement date. I adjust the 
target’s weight by subtracting from the target’s market capitalization the value of target equity 
held by the bidder prior to the acquisition announcement. The weighted average of the abnormal 
returns of the bidder and the target over the three day window is defined as the acquisition 
synergy. 
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Panel A in Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of bidder and target CARs and 
acquisition synergies. Consistent with previous literature on acquisition announcement returns 
(Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001; Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, 1988; Jensen and Ruback, 
1983; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004), for the full sample, target firms experience an 
average of 24.5% announcement abnormal returns. Acquiring firm CARs are slightly negative, -
1.1%, while the average acquisition synergy is 2.4%.  
My primary interest is the difference in the wealth effect between go-shop deals and no-
shop deals. Targets with go-shop provisions experience significantly higher CARs, 30.1%, 
compared to targets without go-shop provisions, 24.1%, during the three-day event window. 
However, there is no significant difference in announcement returns between the bidders of these 
two types of deals. In addition, deals containing go-shop provisions create significantly higher 
synergies, 6.3%, compared with deals without go-shop provisions, 2.3%. The univariate analyses 
indicate that the market reacts favorably to deals with go-shop provisions. 
[ Table 4 here ] 
5.3.2. Premiums 
In this section, I compare the premiums received by target shareholders in go-shop deals 
with that in no-shop deals. In line with Officer (2003), the premium is defined as the bidder's 
offer divided by the target's market value of equity 42 trading days prior to announcement date 
minus one. Four different methods are used to compute the premium paid to the target. The first 
method uses the total value of the transaction, which is referred to as the component data. The 
second and third methods use "initial offer price" and "final offer price", respectively, both 
reported by SDC. The denominator for all premium measures is the target's market value of 
equity 42 days prior to the bid announcement. Due to the outlier issue pointed out by Bates and 
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Lemmon (2003) and Officer (2003), a fourth measure, referred to as the combined premium, is 
computed. Combined premium is based on the component data if that data results in a value 
between 0 and 2, and if not, depends on initial price (or final offer price if initial price data is 
missing) if that data provides a value between 0 and 2. The combined premium is left as a 
missing observation if none of the conditions is met. This combined premium measure is the 
primary measure of premiums. 
Table 4 Panel B shows the mean and median for different premium measures for the full 
sample, the no-shop sample, and the go-shop sample. The premium calculated using component 
data for each group is consistently higher than the premium calculated using price data, 
consistent with results reported in Officer (2003). On a univariate basis, there is no significant 
difference in bid premiums between the go-shop group and no-shop group regardless of the 
premium measure used. These analyses suggest that including go-shop provisions in merger 
agreements does not result in lower premiums than in no-shop deals. This finding supports the 
shareholder interest theory and is consistent with hypothesis H3b which posits that go-shop deals 
are, at least, not detrimental to the target shareholders. 
5.4. Multivariate Wealth Effects 
5.4.1. Target and Bidder Announcement Returns and Acquisition Synergies 
I also examine the market announcement returns to go-shop provisions in a multivariate 
framework. In Table 5 Model 1, I present OLS regressions of target announcement CARs over 
the three-day (-1, +1) event window around the bid announcement date using the go-shop 
dummy variable as the primary independent variable.
10
 Model 1 in Table 5 suggests that 
controlling for various deal, governance, and target firm characteristics, the inclusion of go-shop 
                                                          
10
 As a robustness check, I perform OLS regressions on CARs of the target and the bidder as well as the synergy 
over the five-day (-2, +2) event window around the bid announcement date. The results of the wealth effects of go-
shop provisions still hold. 
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provisions in merger agreements is associated with higher target announcement returns at 10% 
level. I also verify the OLS regression results by running Heckman two-step model and the 
positive impact of go-shop provisions on target announcement returns is confirmed (Model 2 in 
Table 5). These findings of positive market reactions to go-shop deals are consistent with 
hypothesis H1b, supporting the shareholder interest theory. Deal and target firm characteristics 
are significantly associated with target CARs, and the coefficients of the control variables are 
similar to the findings in previous studies (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 
2007; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004; Officer, 2003; Schwert, 2000; Wang and Xie, 
2009).  
[ Table 5 here ] 
Models 3 – 4, which examine go-shop deals only, include the go-shop periods and 
bifurcated termination fee structure respectively. I do not include the number of potential buyers 
contacted and the number of confidentiality agreements because these two factors are 
unobservable by the market participants at the announcement of a bid. Although the length of go-
shop periods does not seem to be associated with announcement returns to the target, results in 
Model 4 indicate that go-shop deal targets with a bifurcated termination fee structure earn 
significantly higher announcement returns than targets that do not have reduced break-up fees. 
This finding suggests that the market perceives the reduced termination fee structure during the 
go-shop period to be valuable in encouraging the target firm to solicit better offers in the post-
signing period. 
As predicted by hypothesis H2b, the OLS regression of the bidder announcement returns 
in Table 6 shows that go-shop provisions are not associated with higher bidder CARs around the 
bid announcements. The market does not seem to consider bidders to be the beneficiaries of the 
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go-shop provision. Since it is possible that the bidder is involved in the target’s decision to 
include go-shop provisions in merger agreements, for the purpose of robustness, I examine the 
bidder’s CARs using Heckman two-step procedure to mitigate potential endogeneity concerns. 
The Heckman second-step regression result is very similar to the OLS result. 
[ Table 6 here ] 
I take a step further to investigate the impact of go-shop provisions on the synergy 
generated by the target and the bidder in a merger transaction. Both OLS and Heckman two-step 
regression results in Table 7 indicate that deals with go-shop provisions create higher acquisition 
synergies. As shown in both Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 7, an average go-shop deal generates 
about 3.4% higher synergy than a deal without a go-shop provision, suggesting that the go-shop 
provision adds value to the surviving entity. 
The wealth effects of go-shop provisions on the target, the bidder and the synergy suggest 
that go-shop provisions are target friendly and increase the synergy generated in the deal, 
confirming the shareholder interest theory that go-shop provisions are at least not harmful, and 
may even be beneficial, to target shareholders and the surviving firm after the acquisition. 
Further, the findings lend some support to the results in Boone and Mulherin (2007) that target 
shareholders in privately negotiated deals are not worse off compared to target shareholders in 
deals that are publicly auctioned. 
[ Table 7 here ] 
5.4.2. Premiums 
In addition to univariate analyses, I examine the wealth effect of go-shop provisions in a 
multivariate framework. As shown in Model 1 in Table 8, controlling for deal characteristics as 
well as target board and firm characteristics, the go-shop provision has no significant impact on 
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the premiums received by the target. This result is consistent with the univariate result presented 
in the previous section. Model 2 is the second stage regression result of Heckman two-step 
procedure which is employed to mitigate the selection bias. The regression result using Heckman 
two-step model is similar to the OLS result in Model 1. 
 [ Table 8 here ] 
5.5. Initial Bidder Behavior: Changes from the Initial Offer to the Final Offer 
Previous literature on go-shop provisions almost exclusively focus on the effects of go-
shop provisions on the target firms but ignore the potential impact on the initial bidders. In order 
to understand the overall effects of go-shop provisions on corporate acquisitions, it is important 
to examine how the “extended shopping hours” influence the initial bidder. In this section, I 
focus on how go-shop provisions may affect the initial bidder’s behavior in the post-signing 
period. 
Under the shareholder interest theory, the target management acts in the best interests of 
target shareholders and use the go-shop provision to obtain the best offer price possibly available 
to the target shareholders. While in theory go-shop provisions are intended to allow the target 
firm to seek potential buyers who are willing to top the original bid, it is possible that the original 
bidder will feel pressured by the inclusion of go-shop provisions in merger agreements, and 
therefore raise its original offer prices subsequent to the merger announcement to make the initial 
bid more attractive (Hypothesis H4b).
11
 On the other hand, the window-dressing theory suggests 
that go-shop deals are associated with severe agency conflicts where the target management 
                                                          
11
 Consistent with this argument, in the recent Dell going-private deal, Mr. Michael Dell and his partner, the 
investment firm Silver Lake, raised their initial offer price by a modest 10 cents from $13.65 to $13.75 per share 
prior to the scheduled shareholder meeting on July 24
th
, 2013 in exchange for a more certain shareholder vote. On 
August 2
nd
, 2013, Mr. Dell and Silver Lake once again sweetened the deal by offering a special dividend of 13 cents 
per share. In return, the special committee agreed to change the voting rules so that abstentions no longer count as 
opposing votes. In the meantime, the break-up fee was lowered from $450 million to $180 million if the deal with 
Mr. Dell and Silver Lake was terminated. 
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colludes with the bidder and thereby, hurting the target shareholders. If the initial bidder knows 
that the target management will sell the target firm at a discounted price in exchange for private 
benefits, the initial bidder should not be affected by the inclusion of the go-shop provision and 
therefore will not raise the original offer price following the announcement of the deal 
(Hypothesis H4a). 
To answer the question whether or how go-shop provisions influence the initial bidder, I 
use multivariate analyses to examine the relation between the inclusion of go-shop provisions in 
merger agreements and the difference between the initial bid premium and the final bid premium. 
I create a dummy variable which is equal to one if the premium calculated using the final price 
data is higher than the premium calculated using the initial price data, and zero if the final 
premium is the same as or below the initial premium. This dummy variable is the dependent 
variable in the logistic regressions in Table 9.  
[ Table 9 here ] 
Model 1 and 2 in Table 9 include deals in the full sample, while Models 3 – 6 focus on 
go-shop deals only. Although the go-shop provision does not influence the overall premiums 
paid to the target, the logistic regression in Model 1 shows that the provision significantly affects 
initial bidders’ behavior in the post-signing period. Specifically, the inclusion of go-shop 
provisions in merger agreements increases the likelihood that the initial bidder raises its original 
bid price following the announcement of the bid. The implication is that go-shop provisions are 
effective and beneficial to the target shareholders in the sense that the presence of these 
provisions pressures initial bidders to raise their original offer prices. 
Intuitively, post-bid competition would motivate the initial bidder to increase the initial 
offer in order to protect the deal. In addition, it may be possible that firms raise their initial bids 
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because these firms paid lower initial premiums upfront. As a result, I include the challenged 
deal dummy variable and the initial premium in the regressions to control for the potential effects 
of challenged deals and initial bid prices on bidders’ behavior. As expected, I observe a 
significant positive correlation between post-bid competition and the likelihood of an increase in 
the initial bidder’s offer (Model 2). Initial premiums, however, do not affect the likelihood of 
raises in offer price following deal announcements, suggesting that the initial bidder’s decision to 
raise the initial offer price is not determined by the original premium. After controlling for post-
bid competition and initial premiums, go-shop provisions are still significantly positively 
associated with offer increases. This finding unveils a previously neglected function of go-shop 
provisions that their inclusion offers the target firm additional bargaining power over the initial 
bidder and pressures the initial bidder to raise its original offer to make its offer more attractive 
and competitive.  
In addition to the positive impact of the go-shop provision and post-bid competition on 
the change in offer price by the initial bidder, several other variables appear to affect the initial 
bidders’ behavior as well. As a deterrent to post-bid competition, the presence of termination 
fees is negatively related to the likelihood of an increase in the original bid. Toeholds, MBO, 
poison pill, and target firm size are positively associated with changes in offer prices by initial 
bidders. Target CEO duality and the inclusion of fiduciary-out provisions reduces the likelihood 
that the bidder raises the initial offer. 
To get a closer look at the impact of go-shop provisions on changes in offer prices, I 
examine the go-shop provision characteristics in Models 3 – 6 that include go-shop deals only. I 
find that the number of potential buyers contacted and the number of confidentiality agreements 
entered during the go-shop period have a significant positive effect on the likelihood of initial 
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bidders raising their bids. This evidence is consistent with Hypothesis H4b that the initial bidder 
feels pressured to increase their initial offer price to protect the deal as the likelihood of deal 
termination increases with the increase in the number of potential buyers contacted and in the 
number of confidentiality agreements entered. 
Overall, consistent with the shareholder interest theory and Hypothesis H4b, the 
regression results in Table 9 reveal a new function of go-shop provisions, namely, changing the 
behavior of the initial bidder, and demonstrate that go-shop provisions can be used to pressure 
the initial bidder to bid upward to secure the original deal.  
5.6. Initial Bid Success 
In this section I examine whether the inclusion of the go-shop provision in merger 
agreements significantly affects the likelihood of the initial bid success in a multivariate 
framework. Table 10 presents the results of logistic regressions of initial bid success. Model 1 
and 2 study all the deals in the full sample, while Models 3 – 6 focus on the go-shop group only. 
The results in Model 1 indicate that unlike deal protection innovations such as 
termination fees, go-shop provisions have a significant negative impact on the likelihood of 
initial deal completion. This higher possibility of deal termination justifies the initial bidders’ 
requirement for termination fees in deals with go-shop provisions. Deal characteristics play an 
important role in the initial bid completion. The parameter estimates of the deal characteristics 
control variables are quantitatively similar to what previous studies have found (Bates and 
Lemmon, 2003; Burch, 2001; Officer, 2003). As shown in Model 2, while post-bid competition 
significantly increases the likelihood of termination of the initial deal, controlling for post-bid 
competition does not change the significant impact of go-shop provisions on the initial bid 
completion. A deal is more likely to be completed if the merger agreement contains a termination 
38 
 
fee agreement or if the deal is a tender offer. MBOs, which are believed to be associated with 
severe agency conflicts between the manager and target shareholders, are more likely to be 
terminated. A deal is less likely to be consummated if the bidder is hostile. Board independence 
is significantly negatively associated with deal completion rate. Interestingly, the fiduciary-out 
provision, designed to allow the target board to terminate the original deal if an unsolicited 
superior price is offered by a third party, is significantly positively related to the initial deal 
completion. This can be viewed as evidence that a fiduciary-out provision is a passive target 
shareholder interest protection device. Overall, the lower initial bid success rate in go-shop deals 
supports the shareholder interest theory (Hypothesis H5b). 
In Models 3 – 6, I focus on go-shop deals and include individual go-shop deal 
characteristics in each model to examine what characteristics influence the initial bid success. 
The length of the go-shop period and the number of confidentiality agreements entered have a 
significant impact on initial bid success rate. Specifically, longer go-shop periods and more 
confidentiality agreements increase the probability of termination of initial bids. As mentioned 
previously, potential bidders entering confidentiality agreements with the target are likely to 
submit a proposal with an offer that tops the original offer price, resulting in higher termination 
rate. Another possible interpretation could be that with a longer go-shop period, the target firm 
may be able to collect more information in terms of its current value as well as its future prospect 
from the market, allowing the target to reconsider the initial bid and thus increasing the 
likelihood of initial deals getting terminated.  
[ Table 10 here ] 
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5.7. Post-Bid Competition 
As suggested by the shareholder interest theory, the inclusion of go-shop provisions 
allows “extended hours” for the target firm to solicit superior offers after signing the merger 
agreement with the initial bidder. Thus, theoretically, the target board’s effort in finding potential 
bidders is supposed to result in higher level of post-bid competition (Hypothesis H6b). On the 
other hand, if the go-shop provision is used by the target management as a “window-dressing” 
device, then there will be no more competition in go-shop deals relative to no-shop deals 
(Hypothesis H6a). In this section, I use logistic regressions to empirically test these hypotheses 
and answer the question whether go-shop provisions lead to more competing bids in the post-
signing period. 
Table 11 displays the determinants of post-bid competition. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable equal to one if a third party launched a competing bid when the initial bid was 
pending and zero otherwise. The independent variable of primary interest is the go-shop dummy 
variable. Model 1 indicates that the go-shop provision is significantly positively associated with 
higher post-bid competing rate, consistent with the shareholder interest theory and hypothesis 
H6b. However, I find that after controlling for the initial premium paid to the target (Model 2), 
the go-shop provision no longer significantly impacts the post-bid competition although the 
coefficient of the go-shop dummy variable is still positive. This suggests that the post-bid 
competition is largely dictated by the premiums paid to the target; higher premiums reduce the 
likelihood of the initial deal getting challenged. It should be noted that although go-shop 
provisions do not invite significantly more competing bids as one might expect, it does not 
necessarily mean that they are harmful to the target shareholders. If the initial bidder offers the 
target a reasonable offer price upfront, the target shareholders do not get hurt even though no 
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more competing bids emerge in the post-signing period. According to the wealth effect analyses 
in this study, bidders in go-shop deals indeed pay premiums that are comparable to premiums 
paid in no-shop deals. 
Several independent variables are significantly related with post-signing competition. 
Consistent with previous studies, target termination fee provisions are a deal protection device 
which is used to deter post-bid competition. Hostile takeovers are associated with higher 
possibility of competing bids, while deals initiated by public bidders are less likely to be 
challenged. I also find that target board independence boosts post-bid competition.  
 [ Table 11 here ] 
5.8. Robustness Check 
To confirm the robustness of the results in this study, I employ the propensity score 
matching procedure (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Villalonga, 2004a) to examine the effects of 
go-shop provisions in merger agreements. As argued in Tucker (2010), propensity score 
matching procedure mitigates selection bias that stem from observable factors. I identify a 
control sample of firms that do not include go-shop provisions by matching each go-shop deal 
with three no-shop deals based on their propensity scores. The propensity scores are estimated 
using all deal and target governance and firm characteristics included in the regression analyses. 
The purpose of propensity score matching is to ensure that a sample deal and its control deals are 
identical except for the inclusion of the go-shop provision (treatment). The results of this 
analysis are reported in Table 12. These results obtained from the propensity score matching 
method confirm the findings reported in the paper.  
[ Table 12 here ] 
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Specifically, I confirm the following findings: go-shop provisions do not affect premiums 
received by the target firms. The target announcement returns are more positive for deals 
containing go-shop provisions and the go-shop provisions are associated with higher deal 
synergies formed by the target and the bidder. Although there is no significant difference in the 
bidder’s announcement returns between the go-shop and no-shop groups, bidders in go-shop 
deals are more likely to raise their initial bids compared to those in no-shop deals. In addition, 
the propensity score matching method indicates that go-shop deals invite more competing bids in 
the post-announcement period and are significantly more likely to be terminated than no-shop 
deals. 
5.9. Limitation 
In studying the effectiveness of go-shop provisions and examining the management’s 
incentives in selling the target firm, it is interesting to investigate what happened before the 
initial agreement to better understand why firms adopt the go-shop provision in merger 
agreements and the importance of this provision. Due to data unavailability, however, I do not 
observe corporate activities prior to the announcement of initial deals. Using data from 
MergerMetrics, Antoniades, Calomiris, and Hitscherich (2013) show that go-shop deals conduct 
significantly fewer pre-announcement auction activities compared to no-shop deals. This finding 
is consistent with my proposition that go-shop provisions are included in merger agreements 
when the target has insufficient pre-signing market check and the management attempts to fulfill 
its fiduciary duties in the post-signing period. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
This paper is one of the first attempts to study the effects of go-shop provisions on a 
variety of deal outcomes and empirically test a series hypotheses based on two competing 
theories: the window-dressing theory and shareholder interest theory. I examine the wealth 
effects of go-shop provisions on both the target and the bidder to assess the effects of these deal-
making devices on acquisition synergies. I also investigate how go-shop provisions may 
influence the initial bidder’s actions in the post-signing period, an important issue that has been 
overlooked in previous literature. This study also documents the impact of go-shop provisions on 
initial bid success as well as post-bid competition. Using a hand-collected sample of detailed go-
shop deal characteristics, namely, the go-shop period, the number of potential buyers contacted, 
the number of confidentiality agreements entered during the go-shop period, and bifurcated 
termination fee structures, I am able to test the impact of these individual go-shop deal features 
and show how they influence go-shop deal outcomes. With go-shop provisions becoming 
increasingly popular in recent corporate acquisitions, I hope that the findings in this study will 
lend helpful implications for future go-shop deals. 
The results indicate that go-shop provisions generally have significantly higher positive 
wealth effect on the targets as compared to no-shop deals, but the bidders’ wealth effect in go-
shop deals is similar to that in no-shop transactions. The synergy generated between the target 
and the bidder is higher in go-shop deals than in no-shop deals. I also show that the inclusion of 
go-shop provisions in merger agreements changes the initial bidders’ behavior in the post-
signing period. Specifically, bidders under merger agreements with go-shop provisions are more 
likely to raise their initial bid offers, suggesting that go-shop provisions allow target firms to 
exert pressure on the initial bidders to obtain better prices on behalf of the target shareholders 
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and thus can be used as a bargaining device against the initial bidders. I also find that go-shop 
deals are significantly more likely to be terminated than no-shop deals. To address concerns 
regarding endogeneity and selection bias, I employ Heckman two-stage procedure and 
propensity score matching method to confirm my findings. In addition, go-shop deal 
characteristics are important determinants of the outcome of deals including go-shop provisions. 
The market reacts positively to the bifurcated fee structure in go-shop provisions. The number of 
potential buyers contacted and the number of confidentiality agreements entered during the go-
shop period play an important role in pressuring the initial bidder to raise the original offer price, 
while the length of the go-shop period and the number of confidentiality agreements entered 
predict the likelihood of the initial bid success. These results are robust and generally support the 
shareholder interest theory that suggests that go-shop provisions are an effective market canvas 
alternative to public auctions. 
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APPENDIX A: GO-SHOP PROVISION EXAMPLE 
Excerpt from Lear’s merger agreement 
This appendix contains an excerpt from the merger agreement between Lear Corporation (the 
“Company”) and American Real Estate Partners LP (the “Parent”), signed on February 5th, 
2007. 
Solicitation of Other Offers  
 Until 11:59 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, on March 26, 2007 (which we sometimes refer to 
as the end of the “go shop” period), we were permitted to initiate, solicit and encourage 
acquisition proposals (including by way of providing access to non-public information pursuant 
to one or more acceptable confidentiality agreements), and participate in discussions or 
negotiations with respect to acquisition proposals or otherwise cooperate with or assist or 
participate in, or facilitate any such discussions or negotiations. 
   After 11:59 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, on March 26, 2007, we have agreed not to: 
 initiate, solicit or knowingly encourage the submission of any inquiries, proposals or 
offers or any other efforts or attempts that constitute or may reasonably be expected to 
lead to any acquisition proposals or engage in any discussions or negotiations with 
respect thereto or otherwise cooperate with or assist or participate in, or knowingly 
facilitate any such inquiries, proposals, offers, discussions or negotiations; 
 approve or recommend, or publicly propose to approve or recommend, any acquisition 
proposal; 
 enter into any merger agreement, letter of intent, agreement in principle, share purchase 
agreement, asset purchase agreement or share exchange agreement, option agreement or 
other similar agreement relating to an acquisition proposal; 
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 enter into any agreement requiring us to abandon, terminate or fail to consummate the 
transactions contemplated by the merger agreement or breach our obligations under the 
merger agreement; or 
 resolve, propose or agree to do any of the foregoing. 
Notwithstanding these restrictions: 
 we are permitted to continue discussions and provide non-public information to any party 
with whom we were having ongoing discussions or negotiations as of March 26, 2007 
regarding a possible acquisition proposal (we were otherwise required to immediately 
cease or cause to be terminated discussions except as permitted below and cause any 
confidential information provided or made available to be returned or destroyed); and 
 at any time after the date of the merger agreement and prior to the approval of the merger 
agreement by our stockholders, we are permitted to furnish information with respect to 
Lear and our subsidiaries to any person making an acquisition proposal and participate in 
discussions or negotiations with the person making the acquisition proposal, subject to 
certain limitations. 
In addition, we may terminate the merger agreement and enter into a definitive agreement 
with respect to a superior proposal under certain circumstances. 
Termination Fees 
      If we terminate the merger agreement or the merger agreement is terminated by Parent or 
Merger Sub under certain circumstances, we must pay a termination fee to Parent. In connection 
with such termination, we are required to pay a fee of $85.2 million to Parent plus up to 
$15 million of Parent’s out-of-pocket expenses (including fees and expenses of financing sources, 
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counsel, accountants, investment bankers, experts and consultants) relating to the merger 
agreement. If such termination had been to accept a superior proposal during the “go shop” 
period, we would have been required to pay a fee of $73.5 million to Parent plus up to $6 million 
of Parent’s out-of-pocket expenses. Under certain circumstances, Parent must pay us a 
termination fee of $250 million. 
Excerpt of Background of the Merger 
Beginning on February 9, 2007, pursuant to the solicitation provisions set forth in the merger 
agreement, JPMorgan contacted parties that it had identified as being potentially interested in 
making a competing proposal to acquire the Company, including those parties that had 
previously expressed to JPMorgan a general interest in exploring such a transaction. On 
February 26, 2007, the special committee expanded the engagement of Evercore to include an 
active role in soliciting, receiving and evaluating competing proposals. JPMorgan and Evercore 
identified potential purchasers on the basis of their likelihood of interest in participating in a 
transaction with the Company and their ability to execute such a transaction. The special 
committee also requested that JPMorgan prepare a debt financing proposal that it would make 
available to parties interested in making a competing proposal. 
As part of the “go shop” process, the special committee established a protocol by which it 
retained active oversight of the solicitation process and the activities of the Company’s 
management and the special committee’s advisors in connection therewith. Contacts with 
potential purchasers were coordinated through the special committee’s advisors, with the 
assistance of management to the extent requested by the special committee and its advisors. 
 During the “go shop” period, JPMorgan and Evercore contacted a total of 41 parties, 
consisting of 24 financial sponsors and 17 potential strategic buyers. No parties initiated contact 
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with Evercore or JPMorgan. Ten of the parties contacted requested a draft confidentiality 
agreement for the purpose of receiving access to confidential due diligence materials, and of 
those, eight parties executed a confidentiality agreement with the Company. The other parties 
contacted by JPMorgan and Evercore declined to participate further in an evaluation of the 
Company. The Company promptly made available to any party who executed a confidentiality 
agreement access to an electronic due diligence data room, a written management presentation 
and an opportunity to meet with management and the special committee’s financial advisors. At 
the direction of the special committee, each party who executed a confidentiality agreement with 
the Company also received a letter from the special committee’s advisors outlining the proposed 
solicitation process. 
 The “go shop” period under the merger agreement expired at 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on 
March 26, 2007. At that time, the Company was engaged in ongoing discussions with three 
parties, who had formed a group for purposes of evaluating a competing proposal. Two members 
of the group subsequently withdrew their interest and terminated discussions with the Company. 
The remaining party thereafter indicated that due to resource constraints, it would require an 
equity partner or partners to pursue a competing proposal and requested that the Company enter 
into discussions and provide confidential information to two private equity firms that had 
indicated an interest in exploring a competing proposal, as a group, with the remaining party. 
Under the merger agreement, the Company was prohibited from doing so without AREP’s 
consent. On May 10, 2007, the Company formally requested AREP’s consent, which was 
granted on May 14, 2007. 
   As of the date of this proxy statement, no party has submitted a competing proposal for the 
Company, although the Company is engaged in certain ongoing discussions. 
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APPENDIX B: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Definition 
Go-Shop Dummy variable equal to one if the merger agreement contains a go-shop 
provision and zero otherwise. 
Gsdays The length of the go-shop period in days. 
Solicited The number of potential buyers contacted by the target and/or its financial 
advisors during the go-shop period. 
Confidentiality The number of confidentiality agreements entered between the target and 
potential buyers during the go-shop period. 
Bifurcated TF Dummy variable equal to one if there is a bifurcated termination fee 
structure in the initial merger agreement and zero otherwise. 
TTF Dummy variable equal to one if a target termination fee is included in the 
merger agreement and zero otherwise. 
Cash deal Dummy variable equal to one if 100% of the deal is financed with cash and 
zero otherwise. 
Hostile Dummy variable equal to one if the attitude of bid is defined as "hostile" 
by SDC and zero otherwise. 
Toehold Dummy variable equal to one if the fraction of the target's common stock 
owned by the bidder is greater than 5% before the bid announcement date 
and zero otherwise. 
Public bidder Dummy variable equal to one if the bidder is a public firm. 
Tender offer Dummy variable equal to one if a deal is identified as a tender offer by 
SDC and zero otherwise. 
Related Dummy variable equal to one if the target is from the same industry as the 
acquirer where industry definitions are taken from Fama and French 12 
industry classifications. 
Completion Dummy variable equal to one if a deal is completed and zero otherwise. 
Challenged deal Dummy variable equal to one if a deal is labeled as a challenged deal by 
SDC and zero otherwise. 
MBO Dummy variable equal to one if the management of the target is reported 
by SDC to be involved in the transaction and zero otherwise. 
Poison pill Dummy variable equal to one if a poison pill affects the bidder's 
acquisition attempt and zero otherwise. 
Fiduciary-out Dummy variable equal to one if a fiduciary-out provision is included in the 
merger agreement and zero otherwise. 
Ln(Board size) The natural log of the number of directors on a target board. 
Independence The percentage of non-executive directors on a target board. 
Duality Dummy variable equal to one if the target CEO is also chairman of the 
target board and zero otherwise. 
Board busyness The percentage of target board members who serve on at least three 
boards. 
M/B The target's market value of assets divided by book value of assets. 
Leverage The target's long-term and current liabilities divided by total assets. 
Ln(Market cap) The natural log of a target's market value (in thousands) of equity 
computed 42 trading days prior to the deal announcement. 
Run-up The target’s market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from 252 days prior to 
the bid announcement to 6 days prior to the bid announcement 
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Variable Definition 
Special committee Dummy variable equal to one if the target firm forms a special committee 
during the negotiations with the bidder and zero otherwise. 
Premium based on 
component/initial price/final 
price data 
The target premium is defined as {(Bidder's offer/Target's market value of 
equity 42 trading days prior to announcement date) - 1}, using the 
total/initial/final value of the transaction. 
TCAR 3-day target cumulative abnormal return calculated using the market 
model. The market model parameters are estimated using the return data 
for the period (-252, -53). 
ACAR 3-day acquirer cumulative abnormal return calculated using the market 
model. The market model parameters are estimated using the return data 
for the period (-252, -53). 
PCAR 
 
3-day cumulative abnormal return calculated using the market model for a 
value-weighted portfolio of the bidder and the target. The market model 
parameters are estimated using the portfolio return data from the period (-
252, -53). The weights for the bidder and the target are based on their 
market capitalizations at the 42
nd
 trading day prior to the announcement. 
The target’s weight is adjusted for the bidder’s toehold. 
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Panel A
Year Full Sample No-shop Go-shop Go-shop%
2004 217 214 3 1.38%
2005 240 239 1 0.42%
2006 271 261 10 3.69%
2007 292 259 33 11.30%
2008 208 195 13 6.25%
2009 166 153 13 7.83%
2010 210 188 22 10.48%
2011 177 160 17 9.60%
2012 182 157 25 13.74%
Total 1963 1826 137 6.98%
The sample consists of 1,963 completed and withdrawn deals from 2004 to 2012 identified from the Securities Data
Corporation (SDC) Mergers and Acquisition Database. My sample excludes deals labeled as spinoffs, recapitalizations,
self-tenders, exchange offers, repurchases, minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, and
privatizations in SDC. Deals are eliminated from the sample if the target is not on both the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat databases. Panel A shows the distribution of go-shop provisions over the period
between 2004 and 2012. Panel B reports means and medians for deal and target characteristics in the sample from 2004
to 2012. Deal value is the compensation (in millions) paid by the acquirer to the target. TTF is a dummy variable equal
to one if a target termination fee is used in the merger agreement and zero otherwise. Cash deal is a dummy variable
equal to one if 100% of the deal is financed with cash and zero otherwise. Toehold is a dummy variable equal to one if
the fraction of the target's common stock owned by the bidder is greater than 5% before the bid announcement date
and zero otherwise. Public bidder is a dummy variable equal to one if the bidder in a deal is a public firm. Tender offer
is a dummy variable equal to one if a deal is identified as a tender offer by SDC and zero otherwise. Related is a dummy
variable equal to one if the target is from the same industry as the acquirer where industry definitions are taken from
Fama and French 12 industry classifications. Fiduciary-out is a dummy variable equal to one if a fiduciary-out provision
is included in the merger agreement and zero otherwise. MBO is a dummy variable equal to one if the management of
the target is reported by SDC to be involved in the transaction and zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy variable equal to
one if the attitude of bid is defined as "hostile" by SDC and zero otherwise. Poison pill is a dummy variable equal to one
if a poison pill affects the bidder's acquisition attempt and zero otherwise. Ln(Board size) is the natural log of the
number of directors on a target board. Independence is the percentage of non-executive directors on a target board.
Duality is a dummy variable equal to one if the target CEO is also chairman of the target board and zero otherwise.
Board busyness is the percentage of target board members who serve on at least three boards. M/B equals the target's
market value of assets divided by book value of assets. Leverage is the target's long-term and current liabilities divided
by total assets. Ln(Market cap) is the natural log of a target's market value (in thousands) of equity computed 42
trading days prior to the deal announcement. Run-up is the target’s market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from 252 days
prior to the bid announcement to 6 days prior to the bid announcement. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%.
***,**,* indicate that the mean and median data are significantly different between go-shop and no-shop deals at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Descriptive Statistics of Go-Shop Deals
Table 1
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Panel B
Mean Mean Mean
Variable N [Median] N [Median] N [Median]
TTF 1963 0.820 1826 0.813 137 0.905 ***
Cash deal 1963 0.596 1826 0.579 137 0.810 ***
Toehold 1963 0.035 1826 0.032 137 0.066 **
Public bidder 1963 0.614 1826 0.644 137 0.219 ***
Tender offer 1963 0.163 1826 0.164 137 0.146
Related 1963 0.643 1826 0.666 137 0.343 ***
Fiduciary-out 1963 0.643 1826 0.636 137 0.745 **
MBO 1963 0.023 1826 0.020 137 0.066 ***
Hostile 1963 0.013 1826 0.014 137 0.007
Poison pill 1963 0.015 1826 0.015 137 0.007
Ln(Board size) 1613 2.067 1478 2.072 135 2.014 **
[2.079] [2.079] [1.946] **
Independence 1613 0.740 1478 0.740 135 0.744
[0.778] [0.778] [0.778]
Duality 1613 0.539 1478 0.545 135 0.467 *
Board busyness 1613 0.421 1478 0.424 135 0.392
[0.429] [0.429] [0.400]
M/B 1963 1.680 1826 1.697 137 1.459 **
[1.324] [1.322] [1.336]
Leverage 1963 0.202 1826 0.202 137 0.205
[0.135] [0.135] [0.128]
Ln(Market cap) 1963 12.494 1826 12.492 137 12.517
[12.441] [12.432] [12.760]
Run-up 1963 -0.029 1826 -0.028 137 -0.034
[-0.080] [-0.076] [-0.107]
Table 1 (Continued)
Full Sample No Shop Go Shop
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Panel A
Variable N Mean Median Min Max
(Std Dev)
Gsdays 135 36.126 37 14 60
(10.015)
Solicited 100 51.870 45 4 140
(33.101)
Confidentiality 91 4.604 3 0 36
(6.410)
Bifurcated TF 126 0.714 1 0 1
(0.454)
Panel B
Variable Gsdays Solicited Confidentiality Bifurcated TF
135 1 0.274*** 0.363*** 0.319***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
100 1 0.559*** 0.005
(0.000) (0.963)
91 1 -0.235**
(0.026)
Bifurcated TF 126 1
Solicited
Confidentiality
This table shows detailed characteristics of go-shop deals. Panel A contains statistics of go-
shop deal characteristics which are hand collected from SEC filings. Gsdays is the length of
the go-shop period in the number of days. Solicited is the number of potential buyers
contacted by the target and/or its financial advisors during the go-shop period. Confidentiality
is the number of confidentiality agreements entered into between the target and potential
buyers during the go-shop period. Bifurcated TF is a dummy variable equal to one if there is
a bifurcated termination fee structure in the initial merger agreement and zero otherwise.
Panel B gives the Pearson correlation among the go-shop characteristics. ***, **, * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Table 2
Go-Shop Deal Characteristics
Gsdays
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Model 1 (Logistic) Model 2 (IV) Model 3 (Heckman First-Stage)
Parameter Estimate Estimate Estimate
Intercept -3.306 ** -4.345 *** -3.454 **
(0.016) (0.000) (0.012)
TTF 1.234 *** 1.219 ***
(0.001) (0.001)
Cash deal 0.408 0.382
(0.124) (0.153)
Toehold 0.411 0.338
(0.355) (0.448)
Public bidder -1.406 *** -1.309 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Tender offer -0.448 -0.344
(0.104) (0.219)
Related -0.796 *** -0.735 ***
(0.000) (0.001)
Fiduciary-out 0.048 -0.282
(0.861) (0.321)
MBO 0.532 0.429
(0.259) (0.368)
Hostile 0.855 0.918
(0.477) (0.428)
Poison pill -0.597 -0.641
(0.592) (0.566)
This table reports determinants of the use of go-shop provisions using logistic regressions. Model 1 is the baseline model including the 
control variables employed in this study. Model 2 examines the impact of the instrumental variable, special committee, on the use of
go-shop provisions. Model 3 is the first stage regression in Heckman two-stage procedure including the instrumental variable. TTF is
a dummy variable equal to one if a target termination fee is used in the merger agreement and zero otherwise. Cash deal is a dummy
variable equal to one if 100% of the deal is financed with cash and zero otherwise. Toehold is a dummy variable equal to one if the
fraction of the target's common stock owned by the bidder is greater than 5% before the bid announcement date and zero otherwise.
Public bidder is a dummy variable equal to one if the bidder in a deal is a public firm. Tender offer is a dummy variable equal to one
if a deal is identified as a tender offer by SDC and zero otherwise. Related is a dummy variable equal to one if the target is from the
same industry as the acquirer where industry definitions are taken from Fama and French 12 industry classifications. Fiduciary-out is
a dummy variable equal to one if a fiduciary-out provision is included in the merger agreement and zero otherwise. MBO is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the management of the target is reported by SDC to be involved in the transaction and zero otherwise.
Hostile is a dummy variable equal to one if the attitude of bid is defined as "hostile" by SDC and zero otherwise. Poison pill is a
dummy variable equal to one if a poison pill affects the bidder's acquisition attempt and zero otherwise. Ln(Board size) is the natural
log of the number of directors on a target board. Independence is the percentage of non-executive directors on a target board.
Duality is a dummy variable equal to one if the target CEO is also chairman of the target board and zero otherwise. Board busyness
is the percentage of target board members who serve on at least three boards. M/B equals the target's market value of assets
divided by book value of assets. Leverage is the target's long-term and current liabilities divided by total assets. Ln(Market cap) is
the natural log of a target's market value (in thousands) of equity computed 42 trading days prior to the deal announcement. Run-up
is the target’s market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from 252 days prior to the bid announcement to 6 days prior to the bid
announcement. Special committee is a dummy variable equal to one if the target firm forms a special committee during the
negotiations with the bidder and zero otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. The regressions control for year
fixed effects. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Determinants of Go-Shop Provisions
Table 3
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Model 1 (Logistic) Model 2 (IV) Model 3 (Heckman First-Stage)
Parameter Estimate Estimate Estimate
Ln(Board size) -0.739 * -0.679
(0.085) (0.120)
Independence 0.297 0.418
(0.701) (0.597)
Duality -0.286 -0.272
(0.158) (0.185)
Board busyness -0.686 -0.610
(0.129) (0.186)
M/B -0.369 ** -0.333 **
(0.019) (0.035)
Leverage -0.229 -0.310
(0.608) (0.496)
Ln(Market cap) 0.191 ** 0.182 **
(0.010) (0.014)
Run-up 0.018 0.027
(0.939) (0.909)
Special committee 1.536 *** 1.049 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Num. of Observations 1613 1963 1613
Pseudo R-Squared 0.101 0.057 0.110
Table 3 (Continued)
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Panel A
T-test
(Wilcoxon Test)
TCAR 0.245 0.241 0.301 0.009 ***
(0.206) (0.204) (0.220) (0.029) **
ACAR -0.011 -0.011 -0.006 0.746
(-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.001) (0.226)
PCAR 0.024 0.023 0.063 0.009 ***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.069) (0.001) ***
Panel B
T-test 
(Wilcoxon Test)
Premium based on component data 0.512 0.511 0.525 0.692
(0.412) (0.412) (0.414) (0.839)
Premium based on initial price data 0.394 0.397 0.363 0.229
(0.326) (0.328) (0.296) (0.183)
Premium based on final price data 0.407 0.408 0.405 0.914
(0.334) (0.338) (0.313) (0.522)
Combined premium 0.506 0.506 0.506 0.989
(0.407) (0.407) (0.381) (0.537)
This table contains univariate analyese results. Panel A exhibits the mean and median (in parentheses) 3-day (-1, +1) cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) for the target, acquirer, and the synergy in the full sample, the go-shop sample, and the no-shop
sample. TCAR and ACAR are the 3-day CARs for the target and the acquirer, respectively. Acquisition synergy (PCAR) is
measured using the methodology employed by Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) and Wang and Xie (2009). For each acquisition, a
value-weighted portfolio of the bidder and the target is formed, with the weights based on their respective market capitalizations
42 trading days prior to the initial announcement of the merger. The acquisition synergy (PCAR) is defined as the portfolio's
cumulative abnormal return during the event window. Panel B shows means and medians (in parentheses) for different measures 
of the premium offered to target shareholders in the full sample, go-shop sample, and no-shop sample. The calculation of the
premium in this study follows Officer (2003). The target premium is defined as {(Bidder's offer/Target's market value of equity
42 trading days prior to announcement date) - 1}. Four different methods are used to compute the premium paid to the target.
The first method uses the total value of the transaction, which is referred to as the component data in Officer (2003). The second 
and third methods use "initial offer price" and "final offer price", respectively, both reported by SDC. The denominator for all
premium measures is the target's market value of equity 42 days prior to the bid announcement. Due to the outlier issue pointed
out by Bates and Lemmon (2003) and Officer (2003), a fourth measure, called the combined premium, is computed. Combined
premium is based on the component data if that data results in a value between 0 and 2, and if not, relies on initial price (or final
offer price if initial price data is missing) if that data provides a value between 0 and 2. If neither condition is met, the combined
premium is left as a missing observation. For both Panel A and Panel B, the last column is the test statistics testing the
significance of the difference in mean (median) between the go-shop sample and no-shop sample. ***, **, * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Wealth Effect Univariate Analyses
Table 4
Variables
Full Sample No-Shop Go-ShopVariables
Go ShopNo ShopFull Sample
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Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (Heckman) Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 0.216 *** 0.142  1.075 ** 1.264 **
(0.003) (0.165) (0.014) (0.010)
Go-shop 0.045 * 0.047 *  
(0.083) (0.075)
Gsdays 0.000
(0.952)
Bifurcated TF 0.121 **
(0.047)
TTF 0.109 *** 0.128 *** 0.203  0.215 *
(0.000) (0.000) (0.100) (0.093)
Cash deal 0.086 *** 0.092 *** -0.115  -0.084  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.106) (0.219)
Toehold 0.038  0.045  0.060  0.127  
(0.357) (0.296) (0.688) (0.507)
Public bidder 0.065 *** 0.044 * 0.039  0.098 *
(0.000) (0.094) (0.417) (0.064)
Tender offer 0.071 *** 0.064 *** -0.021  -0.002  
(0.000) (0.002) (0.704) (0.977)
Related 0.024 * 0.012  -0.107 ** -0.090 *
(0.090) (0.529) (0.043) (0.089)
Fiduciary-out 0.010  0.008  -0.034  -0.018  
(0.528) (0.630) (0.664) (0.827)
MBO 0.004  0.013  -0.029  -0.037  
(0.896) (0.649) (0.677) (0.612)
Hostile 0.040  0.052  0.058  0.039  
(0.356) (0.250) (0.530) (0.671)
Poison pill 0.030  0.020  -0.081  -0.172  
(0.361) (0.574) (0.489) (0.156)
This table presents multivariate regression results for deal premiums. The dependent variable is the target's cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) over the 3-day (-1, +1) event window around the bid announcement date, where event day 0 is the
bid announcement date. Model 1 shows the OLS regression results. Model 2 is the result of Heckman two-stage regression.
Model 3 and 4 focus on the go-shop sample only. Go-shop is a dummy variable equal to one if a deal contains a go-shop
provision in the merger agreement and zero otherwise. Gsdays is the length of the go-shop period in the number of days.
Bifurcated TF is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a bifurcated termination fee structure in the agreement with the
initial bidder and zero otherwise. TTF is a dummy variable equal to one if a target termination fee is used in the merger
agreement and zero otherwise. Cash deal is a dummy variable equal to one if 100% of the deal is financed with cash and zero
otherwise. Toehold is a dummy variable equal to one if the fraction of the target's common stock owned by the bidder is
greater than 5% before the bid announcement date and zero otherwise. Public bidder is a dummy variable equal to one if the
bidder in a deal is a public firm. Tender offer is a dummy variable equal to one if a deal is identified as a tender offer by SDC
and zero otherwise. Related is a dummy variable equal to one if the target is from the same industry as the acquirer where
industry definitions are taken from Fama and French 12 industry classifications. Fiduciary-out is a dummy variable equal to
one if a fiduciary-out provision is included in the merger agreement and zero otherwise. MBO is a dummy variable equal to
one if the management of the target is reported by SDC to be involved in the transaction and zero otherwise. Hostile is a
dummy variable equal to one if the attitude of bid is defined as "hostile" by SDC and zero otherwise. Poison pill is a dummy
variable equal to one if a poison pill affects the bidder's acquisition attempt and zero otherwise. Ln(Board size) is the natural
log of the number of directors on a target board. Independence is the percentage of non-executive directors on a target board.
Duality is a dummy variable equal to one if the target CEO is also chairman of the target board and zero otherwise. Board
busyness is the percentage of target board members who serve on at least three boards. M/B equals the target's market value
of assets divided by book value of assets. Leverage is the target's long-term and current liabilities divided by total assets.
Ln(Market cap) is the natural log of a target's market value (in thousands) of equity computed 42 trading days prior to the
deal announcement. Run-up is the target’s market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from 252 days prior to the bid announcement
to 6 days prior to the bid announcement. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. The regressions control for year fixed
effects. White's heteroskedasticity-consistent p-values are provided in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Multivariate Regression of Target Announcement Returns
Table 5
Full Sample Go-shop Sample
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Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (Heckman) Model 3 Model 4
Ln(Board size) 0.024  0.012  -0.091  -0.192  
(0.329) (0.662) (0.449) (0.138)
Independence 0.040  0.046  0.058  0.156  
(0.329) (0.270) (0.759) (0.417)
Duality -0.004  -0.010  -0.019  -0.014  
(0.746) (0.478) (0.658) (0.731)
Board busyness 0.054 * 0.046  0.145  0.192 *
(0.070) (0.151) (0.213) (0.087)
M/B 0.004  0.000  -0.025  -0.017  
(0.497) (0.965) (0.508) (0.743)
Leverage -0.003  -0.007  -0.079  -0.112  
(0.927) (0.824) (0.425) (0.225)
Ln(Market cap) -0.025 *** -0.023 *** -0.053 ** -0.060 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.042) (0.019)
Run-up -0.096 *** -0.095 *** -0.136 ** -0.140 **
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.018) (0.016)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.037
(0.323)
Num. of Observations 1613 1613 133 124
Adjusted R-Squared 0.153 0.153 0.079 0.124
Full Sample Go-shop Sample
Table 5 (Continued)
59 
 
 
Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (Heckman)
Intercept -0.001 -0.004
(0.980) (0.952)
Go-shop -0.005 -0.005
(0.837) (0.837)
TTF -0.019 ** -0.018
(0.029) (0.244)
Cash deal 0.022 *** 0.023 ***
(0.000) (0.002)
Toehold -0.025 -0.024
(0.192) (0.222)
Public bidder
Tender offer 0.008 0.008
(0.191) (0.290)
Related -0.001 -0.001
(0.940) (0.908)
Fiduciary-out 0.002 0.002
(0.729) (0.763)
MBO
Hostile -0.022 -0.022
(0.242) (0.291)
Poison pill 0.036 *** 0.036 **
(0.009) (0.023)
This table presents multivariate regression results for deal premiums. The dependent variable is the bidder's
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the 3-day (-1, +1) event window around the bid announcement date,
where event day 0 is the bid announcement date. Model 1 shows the OLS regression results. Model 2 is the result of
Heckman two-stage regression. Go-shop is a dummy variable equal to one if a deal contains a go-shop provision in
the merger agreement and zero otherwise. TTF is a dummy variable equal to one if a target termination fee is used in 
the merger agreement and zero otherwise. Cash deal is a dummy variable equal to one if 100% of the deal is
financed with cash and zero otherwise. Toehold is a dummy variable equal to one if the fraction of the target's
common stock owned by the bidder is greater than 5% before the bid announcement date and zero otherwise. Public
bidder is a dummy variable equal to one if the bidder in a deal is a public firm. Tender offer is a dummy variable
equal to one if a deal is identified as a tender offer by SDC and zero otherwise. Related is a dummy variable equal to
one if the target is from the same industry as the acquirer where industry definitions are taken from Fama and
French 12 industry classifications. Fiduciary-out is a dummy variable equal to one if a fiduciary-out provision is
included in the merger agreement and zero otherwise. MBO is a dummy variable equal to one if the management of
the target is reported by SDC to be involved in the transaction and zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy variable equal
to one if the attitude of bid is defined as "hostile" by SDC and zero otherwise. Poison pill is a dummy variable equal to 
one if a poison pill affects the bidder's acquisition attempt and zero otherwise. Ln(Board size) is the natural log of the
number of directors on a target board. Independence is the percentage of non-executive directors on a target board.
Duality is a dummy variable equal to one if the target CEO is also chairman of the target board and zero otherwise.
Board busyness is the percentage of target board members who serve on at least three boards. M/B equals the
target's market value of assets divided by book value of assets. Leverage is the target's long-term and current
liabilities divided by total assets. Ln(Market cap) is the natural log of a target's market value (in thousands) of equity
computed 42 trading days prior to the deal announcement. Run-up is the target’s market-adjusted buy-and-hold
return from 252 days prior to the bid announcement to 6 days prior to the bid announcement. All continuous variables
are winsorized at 1%. The regressions control for year fixed effects. White's heteroskedasticity-consistent p-values
are provided in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Multivariate Regression of Bidder Announcement Returns
Table 6
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Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (Heckman)
Ln(Board size) 0.001 0.000
(0.944) (0.990)
Independence 0.001 0.002
(0.941) (0.933)
Duality -0.004 -0.004
(0.498) (0.591)
Board busyness -0.006 -0.006
(0.631) (0.648)
M/B -0.004 -0.004
(0.136) (0.388)
Leverage 0.058 *** 0.058 ***
(0.000) (0.001)
Ln(Market cap) -0.003 * -0.003
(0.082) (0.264)
Run-up 0.008 0.008
(0.159) (0.160)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.001
(0.955)
Num. of Observations 721 721
Adjusted R-Squared 0.065 0.064
Table 6 (Continued)
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Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (Heckman)
Intercept 0.006 0.004
(0.852) (0.941)
Go-shop 0.034 *** 0.034 ***
(0.005) (0.005)
TTF -0.018 ** -0.018
(0.045) (0.203)
Cash deal 0.006 0.006
(0.277) (0.346)
Toehold -0.046 ** -0.045 **
(0.022) (0.023)
Public bidder
Tender offer 0.006 0.006
(0.381) (0.437)
Related 0.002 0.002
(0.769) (0.834)
Fiduciary-out 0.004 0.004
(0.565) (0.587)
MBO
Hostile 0.023 0.023
(0.333) (0.346)
Poison pill 0.063 ** 0.063 **
(0.032) (0.036)
This table presents multivariate regression results for deal premiums. The dependent variable is the synergy created
between the target and the bidder over the 3-day (-1, +1) event window around the bid announcement date, where
event day 0 is the bid announcement date. Model 1 shows the OLS regression results. Model 2 is the result of
Heckman two-stage regression. Go-shop is a dummy variable equal to one if a deal contains a go-shop provision in
the merger agreement and zero otherwise. TTF is a dummy variable equal to one if a target termination fee is used
in the merger agreement and zero otherwise. Cash deal is a dummy variable equal to one if 100% of the deal is
financed with cash and zero otherwise. Toehold is a dummy variable equal to one if the fraction of the target's
common stock owned by the bidder is greater than 5% before the bid announcement date and zero otherwise. Public
bidder is a dummy variable equal to one if the bidder in a deal is a public firm. Tender offer is a dummy variable
equal to one if a deal is identified as a tender offer by SDC and zero otherwise. Related is a dummy variable equal
to one if the target is from the same industry as the acquirer where industry definitions are taken from Fama and
French 12 industry classifications. Fiduciary-out is a dummy variable equal to one if a fiduciary-out provision is
included in the merger agreement and zero otherwise. MBO is a dummy variable equal to one if the management of
the target is reported by SDC to be involved in the transaction and zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy variable equal
to one if the attitude of bid is defined as "hostile" by SDC and zero otherwise. Poison pill is a dummy variable equal
to one if a poison pill affects the bidder's acquisition attempt and zero otherwise. Ln(Board size) is the natural log of
the number of directors on a target board. Independence is the percentage of non-executive directors on a target
board. Duality is a dummy variable equal to one if the target CEO is also chairman of the target board and zero
otherwise. Board busyness is the percentage of target board members who serve on at least three boards. M/B
equals the target's market value of assets divided by book value of assets. Leverage is the target's long-term and
current liabilities divided by total assets. Ln(Market cap) is the natural log of a target's market value (in thousands)
of equity computed 42 trading days prior to the deal announcement. Run-up is the target’s market-adjusted buy-and-
hold return from 252 days prior to the bid announcement to 6 days prior to the bid announcement. All continuous
variables are winsorized at 1%. The regressions control for year fixed effects. White's heteroskedasticity-consistent
p-values are provided in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Multivariate Regression of Synergy
Table 7
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Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (Heckman)
Ln(Board size) 0.003 0.003
(0.786) (0.838)
Independence 0.003 0.004
(0.879) (0.879)
Duality -0.004 -0.004
(0.442) (0.506)
Board busyness 0.001 0.001
(0.918) (0.927)
M/B -0.004 -0.004
(0.174) (0.330)
Leverage 0.035 ** 0.035 **
(0.037) (0.042)
Ln(Market cap) 0.001 0.001
(0.780) (0.802)
Run-up -0.008 -0.008
(0.244) (0.245)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.000
(0.981)
Num. of Observations 721 721
Adjusted R-Squared 0.042 0.041
Table 7 (Continued)
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Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (Heckman)
Intercept 0.952 *** 1.013 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Go-shop 0.036  0.035  
(0.311) (0.330)
TTF 0.059 * 0.043  
(0.063) (0.378)
Cash deal -0.067 *** -0.072 ***
(0.004) (0.008)
Toehold -0.171 *** -0.176 ***
(0.001) (0.001)
Public bidder 0.053 ** 0.070  
(0.028) (0.152)
Tender offer 0.078 *** 0.083 ***
(0.002) (0.004)
Related -0.024  -0.014  
(0.281) (0.650)
Fiduciary-out -0.014  -0.013  
(0.548) (0.611)
MBO -0.038  -0.045  
(0.424) (0.377)
Hostile 0.028  0.018  
(0.718) (0.824)
Poison pill 0.077  0.086  
(0.332) (0.300)
This table presents multivariate regression results for deal premiums. The dependent variable is the combined premium
calculated in Table 4. Model 1 shows the OLS regression results. Model 2 is the result of Heckman two-stage
regression. Go-shop is a dummy variable equal to one if a deal contains a go-shop provision in the merger agreement
and zero otherwise. TTF is a dummy variable equal to one if a target termination fee is used in the merger agreement
and zero otherwise. Cash deal is a dummy variable equal to one if 100% of the deal is financed with cash and zero
otherwise. Toehold is a dummy variable equal to one if the fraction of the target's common stock owned by the bidder
is greater than 5% before the bid announcement date and zero otherwise. Public bidder is a dummy variable equal to
one if the bidder in a deal is a public firm. Tender offer is a dummy variable equal to one if a deal is identified as a
tender offer by SDC and zero otherwise. Related is a dummy variable equal to one if the target is from the same
industry as the acquirer where industry definitions are taken from Fama and French 12 industry classifications.
Fiduciary-out is a dummy variable equal to one if a fiduciary-out provision is included in the merger agreement and zero
otherwise. MBO is a dummy variable equal to one if the management of the target is reported by SDC to be involved
in the transaction and zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy variable equal to one if the attitude of bid is defined as
"hostile" by SDC and zero otherwise. Poison pill is a dummy variable equal to one if a poison pill affects the bidder's
acquisition attempt and zero otherwise. Ln(Board size) is the natural log of the number of directors on a target board.
Independence is the percentage of non-executive directors on a target board. Duality is a dummy variable equal to one
if the target CEO is also chairman of the target board and zero otherwise. Board busyness is the percentage of target
board members who serve on at least three boards. M/B equals the target's market value of assets divided by book
value of assets. Leverage is the target's long-term and current liabilities divided by total assets. Ln(Market cap) is the
natural log of a target's market value (in thousands) of equity computed 42 trading days prior to the deal announcement. 
Run-up is the target’s market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from 252 days prior to the bid announcement to 6 days prior
to the bid announcement. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. The regressions control for year fixed effects.
White's heteroskedasticity-consistent p-values are provided in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Multivariate Regression of Premium
Table 8
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Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (Heckman)
Ln(Board size) 0.105 *** 0.115 **
(0.007) (0.015)
Independence 0.114  0.110  
(0.105) (0.125)
Duality 0.018  0.022  
(0.349) (0.325)
Board busyness 0.137 *** 0.145 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
M/B 0.029 *** 0.033 **
(0.007) (0.022)
Leverage 0.237 *** 0.240 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Market cap) -0.068 *** -0.071 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Run-up 0.048 ** 0.047 *
(0.047) (0.053)
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.029  
(0.687)
Num. of Observations 1474 1474
Adjusted R-Squared 0.115 0.114
Table 8 (Continued)
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept -3.422 ** -3.464 ** 1.914 -6.911 -4.805 -0.819
(0.010) (0.013) (0.732) (0.433) (0.630) (0.902)
Go-shop 0.820 ** 0.768 **
(0.012) (0.028)
Gsdays 0.076
(0.114)
Solicited 0.041 **
(0.019)
Confidentiality 0.220 *
(0.070)
Bifurcated TF -0.546
(0.521)
Challenged deal 2.495 *** 2.697 ** 2.503 2.872 2.702 **
(0.000) (0.020) (0.190) (0.161) (0.020)
Initial premium -0.335 -1.678 0.685 0.535 -0.938
(0.448) (0.322) (0.714) (0.786) (0.558)
TTF -0.852 *** -0.837 *** -2.461 * -1.885 -3.461 * -2.423 *
(0.005) (0.009) (0.070) (0.282) (0.079) (0.083)
Cash deal 0.117 0.204 0.925 0.535 1.431 1.274
(0.661) (0.468) (0.388) (0.726) (0.378) (0.323)
Toehold 1.997 *** 2.041 *** 2.408 * 3.408 4.014 * 2.654 *
(0.000) (0.000) (0.051) (0.107) (0.066) (0.072)
Public bidder 0.160 0.442 2.619 *** 2.058 2.712 * 2.501 **
(0.572) (0.149) (0.004) (0.109) (0.082) (0.011)
Tender offer 0.144 0.311 1.095 2.121 0.722 0.265
(0.606) (0.284) (0.205) (0.103) (0.603) (0.794)
Related -0.024 -0.077 -1.363 -0.480 -1.587 -1.704 *
(0.925) (0.773) (0.126) (0.700) (0.244) (0.080)
Fiduciary-out -0.482 * -0.503 * 0.765 0.508 1.328 1.179
(0.086) (0.090) (0.472) (0.783) (0.452) (0.316)
MBO 1.783 *** 1.803 *** 3.709 *** 4.507 ** 4.881 ** 3.185 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.010) (0.018) (0.006)
Hostile 0.933 0.009 - - - -
(0.142) (0.990)
Poison pill 2.687 *** 2.984 *** - - - -
(0.000) (0.000)
Full Sample Go-Shop Sample
Table 9  
Initial Bidder Behavior: Changes from the Initial Offer to the Final Offer
This table examines the impact of go-shop provisions on the initial bidder's behavior using logistic regressions. Model 1 and 2 include firms in the full sample,
while Model 3 through Model 6 focus on go-shop deals only. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if a bidder's final offer is higher than
the initial offer and zero if the final offer is the same as or below the initial offer. Go-shop is a dummy variable equal to one if a deal contains a go-shop
provision in the merger agreement and zero otherwise. Gsdays is the length of the go-shop period in the number of days. Solicited is the number of potential
bidders contacted by the target during the go-shop period. Confidentiality is the number of confidentiality agreements entered between the target and
potential buyers during the go-shop period. Bifurcated TF is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a bifurcated termination fee structure in the agreement
with the initial bidder and zero otherwise. Challenged deal is is a dummy variable equal to one if a third party launched a competing offer when the initial bid
was pending and zero otherwise. Initial premium is calculated as {(Bidder's initial offer/Target's market value of equity 42 trading days prior to
announcement date) - 1}. TTF is a dummy variable equal to one if a target termination fee is used in the merger agreement and zero otherwise. Cash deal is
a dummy variable equal to one if 100% of the deal is financed with cash and zero otherwise. Toehold is a dummy variable equal to one if the fraction of the
target's common stock owned by the bidder is greater than 5% before the bid announcement date and zero otherwise. Public bidder is a dummy variable
equal to one if the bidder in a deal is a public firm. Tender offer is a dummy variable equal to one if a deal is identified as a tender offer by SDC and zero
otherwise. Related is a dummy variable equal to one if the target is from the same industry as the acquirer where industry definitions are taken from Fama
and French 12 industry classifications. Fiduciary-out is a dummy variable equal to one if a fiduciary-out provision is included in the merger agreement and
zero otherwise. MBO is a dummy variable equal to one if the management of the target is reported by SDC to be involved in the transaction and zero
otherwise. Hostile is a dummy variable equal to one if the attitude of bid is defined as "hostile" by SDC and zero otherwise. Poison pill is a dummy variable
equal to one if a poison pill affects the bidder's acquisition attempt and zero otherwise. Ln(Board size) is the natural log of the number of directors on a
target board. Independence is the percentage of non-executive directors on a target board. Duality is a dummy variable equal to one if the target CEO is
also chairman of the target board and zero otherwise. Board busyness is the percentage of target board members who serve on at least three boards. M/B
equals the target's market value of assets divided by book value of assets. Leverage is the target's long-term and current liabilities divided by total assets.
Ln(Market cap) is the natural log of a target's market value (in thousands) of equity computed 42 trading days prior to the deal announcement. Run-up is the
target’s market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from 252 days prior to the bid announcement to 6 days prior to the bid announcement. All continuous variables
are winsorized at 1%. The regressions control for year fixed effects. P-values are provided in parentheses. Estimates marked as "-" are ommitted due to
separation issues in logistic regressions. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Ln(Board size) -0.601 -0.533 -1.035 -1.456 -0.341 -0.664
(0.194) (0.264) (0.542) (0.613) (0.906) (0.730)
Independence 0.637 0.100 -0.065 -0.867 0.365 1.010
(0.446) (0.908) (0.983) (0.794) (0.924) (0.742)
Duality -0.455 ** -0.478 ** -0.270 0.753 0.272 -0.028
(0.046) (0.044) (0.745) (0.542) (0.817) (0.973)
Board busyness -0.154 -0.118 -0.876 -3.149 -4.358 -1.013
(0.759) (0.824) (0.620) (0.286) (0.155) (0.583)
M/B 0.017 -0.025 -0.055 -0.842 -0.943 -0.238
(0.883) (0.840) (0.930) (0.536) (0.495) (0.773)
Leverage 0.596 0.739 -0.381 1.202 -0.585 -1.009
(0.201) (0.124) (0.835) (0.617) (0.793) (0.582)
Ln(Market cap) 0.148 * 0.150 * -0.303 0.506 0.296 0.022
(0.068) (0.097) (0.426) (0.441) (0.600) (0.949)
Run-up 0.133 0.039 0.220 -0.377 0.890 -0.717
(0.589) (0.880) (0.825) (0.786) (0.632) (0.524)
Num. of Observations 1355 1355 118 90 82 111
Pseudo R-Squared 0.126 0.159 0.264 0.289 0.289 0.221
Full Sample Go-Shop Sample
Table 9 (Continued)
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept -0.324 -0.926 4.437 5.543 4.336 5.473
(0.734) (0.355) (0.243) (0.221) (0.344) (0.159)
Go-shop -1.056 *** -1.003 ***
(0.000) (0.001)
Gsdays -0.116 ***
(0.002)
Solicited 0.003
(0.818)
Confidentiality -0.106 **
(0.042)
Bifurcated TF 0.382
(0.555)
Challenged deal -2.932 *** -3.224 *** -3.196 ** -1.922 -2.573 **
(0.000) (0.002) (0.018) (0.176) (0.016)
TTF 1.865 *** 1.944 *** 0.661 1.323 1.971 -0.754
(0.000) (0.000) (0.531) (0.334) (0.138) (0.604)
Cash deal 0.199 0.212 0.221 -0.267 -0.272 0.391
(0.311) (0.304) (0.756) (0.770) (0.780) (0.606)
Toehold - - - - - -
Public bidder 0.258 0.117 0.460 0.262 0.702 0.387
(0.243) (0.615) (0.612) (0.831) (0.594) (0.682)
Tender offer 1.537 *** 1.621 *** - - - 0.928
(0.000) (0.000) (0.444)
Related -0.019 0.004 0.223 0.858 2.036 * 1.069
(0.926) (0.985) (0.765) (0.298) (0.051) (0.137)
Fiduciary-out 0.985 *** 1.066 *** 0.515 -0.908 -0.650 -0.290
(0.000) (0.000) (0.459) (0.369) (0.504) (0.679)
MBO -0.991 ** -1.110 ** -0.361 0.486 0.297 -0.174
(0.016) (0.011) (0.704) (0.645) (0.783) (0.847)
Hostile -3.617 *** -3.360 *** - - - -
(0.000) (0.000)
Poison pill -0.836 -0.999 - - - -
(0.162) (0.114)
Full Sample Go-Shop Sample
This table examines the impact of go-shop provisions on the initial bid success using logistic regressions. Model 1 and 2 include firms in the full sample, while
Model 3 through Model 6 focus on go-shop deals only. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the initial bid is completed. Go-shop is a
dummy variable equal to one if a deal contains a go-shop provision in the merger agreement and zero otherwise. Gsdays is the length of the go-shop period in the
number of days. Solicited is the number of potential bidders contacted by the target during the go-shop period. Confidentiality is the number of confidentiality
agreements entered between the target and potential buyers during the go-shop period. Bifurcated TF is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a bifurcated
termination fee structure in the agreement with the initial bidder and zero otherwise. TTF is a dummy variable equal to one if a target termination fee is used in
the merger agreement and zero otherwise. Cash deal is a dummy variable equal to one if 100% of the deal is financed with cash and zero otherwise. Toehold is
a dummy variable equal to one if the fraction of the target's common stock owned by the bidder is greater than 5% before the bid announcement date and zero
otherwise. Public bidder is a dummy variable equal to one if the bidder in a deal is a public firm. Tender offer is a dummy variable equal to one if a deal is
identified as a tender offer by SDC and zero otherwise. Related is a dummy variable equal to one if the target is from the same industry as the acquirer where
industry definitions are taken from Fama and French 12 industry classifications. Fiduciary-out is a dummy variable equal to one if a fiduciary-out provision is
included in the merger agreement and zero otherwise. MBO is a dummy variable equal to one if the management of the target is reported by SDC to be involved
in the transaction and zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy variable equal to one if the attitude of bid is defined as "hostile" by SDC and zero otherwise. Poison pill
is a dummy variable equal to one if a poison pill affects the bidder's acquisition attempt and zero otherwise. Ln(Board size) is the natural log of the number of
directors on a target board. Independence is the percentage of non-executive directors on a target board. Duality is a dummy variable equal to one if the target
CEO is also chairman of the target board and zero otherwise. Board busyness is the percentage of target board members who serve on at least three boards.
M/B equals the target's market value of assets divided by book value of assets. Leverage is the target's long-term and current liabilities divided by total assets.
Ln(Market cap) is the natural log of a target's market value (in thousands) of equity computed 42 trading days prior to the deal announcement. Run-up is the
target’s market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from 252 days prior to the bid announcement to 6 days prior to the bid announcement. All continuous variables are
winsorized at 1%. The regressions control for year fixed effects. P-values are provided in parentheses. Estimates marked as "-" are ommitted due to separation
issues in logistic regressions. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Initial Bid Success
Table 10
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Ln(Board size) 0.466 0.454 0.314 -0.796 -1.939 -0.834
(0.185) (0.211) (0.806) (0.631) (0.282) (0.528)
Independence -1.715 *** -1.312 ** 0.341 1.008 0.856 -1.048
(0.008) (0.048) (0.900) (0.704) (0.761) (0.677)
Duality -0.146 -0.156 0.095 -0.348 -0.361 -0.315
(0.402) (0.392) (0.878) (0.637) (0.649) (0.592)
Board busyness 0.158 0.212 2.565 * 3.488 * 2.596 2.275
(0.675) (0.592) (0.082) (0.078) (0.157) (0.125)
M/B 0.075 0.115 -0.234 0.487 0.672 0.148
(0.438) (0.231) (0.599) (0.533) (0.406) (0.799)
Leverage 0.277 0.209 -2.240 * -1.643 -2.437 -1.280
(0.472) (0.598) (0.091) (0.266) (0.134) (0.307)
Ln(Market cap) -0.008 0.018 -0.043 -0.387 -0.125 -0.158
(0.889) (0.762) (0.855) (0.248) (0.692) (0.499)
Run-up -0.346 * -0.296 0.315 1.767 * 2.260 * 1.402 *
(0.084) (0.151) (0.647) (0.081) (0.081) (0.093)
Num. of Observations 1613 1613 133 98 89 124
Pseudo R-Squared 0.230 0.268 0.279 0.227 0.257 0.209
Full Sample Go-Shop Sample
Table 10 (Continued)
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Model 1 Model 2
Intercept -5.312 *** -3.010 *
(0.001) (0.079)
Go-shop 0.670 * 0.638
(0.079) (0.120)
Initial premium -1.361 **
(0.026)
TTF -0.393 -0.712 *
(0.290) (0.081)
Cash deal -0.155 -0.434
(0.586) (0.172)
Toehold 0.137 0.156
(0.831) (0.815)
Public bidder -0.851 *** -1.011 ***
(0.007) (0.004)
Tender offer -0.644 -0.556
(0.109) (0.206)
Related 0.210 0.164
(0.458) (0.595)
Fiduciary-out -0.061 0.030
(0.853) (0.935)
MBO 0.367 0.203
(0.543) (0.745)
Hostile 2.427 *** 2.808 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Poison pill -0.176 -0.602
(0.828) (0.492)
This table examines the impact of go-shop provisions on post-bid competition using logistic regressions.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if a third party launched a competing offer when 
the initial bid was pending and zero otherwise. Go-shop is a dummy variable equal to one if a deal
contains a go-shop provision in the merger agreement and zero otherwise. Initial premium is calculated as
{(Bidder's initial offer/Target's market value of equity 42 trading days prior to announcement date) - 1}.
TTF is a dummy variable equal to one if a target termination fee is used in the merger agreement and zero
otherwise. Cash deal is a dummy variable equal to one if 100% of the deal is financed with cash and zero
otherwise. Toehold is a dummy variable equal to one if the fraction of the target's common stock owned
by the bidder is greater than 5% before the bid announcement date and zero otherwise. Public bidder is a
dummy variable equal to one if the bidder in a deal is a public firm. Tender offer is a dummy variable
equal to one if a deal is identified as a tender offer by SDC and zero otherwise. Related is a dummy
variable equal to one if the target is from the same industry as the acquirer where industry definitions are
taken from Fama and French 12 industry classifications. Fiduciary-out is a dummy variable equal to one
if a fiduciary-out provision is included in the merger agreement and zero otherwise. MBO is a dummy
variable equal to one if the management of the target is reported by SDC to be involved in the transaction
and zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy variable equal to one if the attitude of bid is defined as "hostile"
by SDC and zero otherwise. Poison pill is a dummy variable equal to one if a poison pill affects the
bidder's acquisition attempt and zero otherwise. Ln(Board size) is the natural log of the number of
directors on a target board. Independence is the percentage of non-executive directors on a target board.
Duality is a dummy variable equal to one if the target CEO is also chairman of the target board and zero
otherwise. Board busyness is the percentage of target board members who serve on at least three boards.
M/B equals the target's market value of assets divided by book value of assets. Leverage is the target's
long-term and current liabilities divided by total assets. Ln(Market cap) is the natural log of a target's
market value (in thousands) of equity computed 42 trading days prior to the deal announcement. Run-up
is the target’s market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from 252 days prior to the bid announcement to 6
days prior to the bid announcement. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. The regressions
control for year fixed effects. P-values are provided in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Table 11
Post-Bid Competition
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Model 1 Model 2
Ln(Board size) -0.225 -0.227
(0.665) (0.687)
Independence 2.337 ** 1.938 *
(0.025) (0.077)
Duality 0.057 -0.049
(0.822) (0.860)
Board busyness 0.144 0.246
(0.790) (0.681)
M/B 0.209 * 0.224 *
(0.059) (0.085)
Leverage -0.385 -0.179
(0.495) (0.765)
Ln(Market cap) 0.079 -0.007
(0.355) (0.947)
Run-up 0.323 0.256
(0.234) (0.406)
Num. of Observations 1613 1366
Pseudo R-Squared 0.035 0.051
Table 11 (Continued)
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ABSTRACT 
DEAL INNOVATIONS IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: DO GO-SHOP 
PROVISIONS CREATE REAL BENEFITS? 
by 
CHENGUANG SHANG 
May 2014 
Advisor: Dr. Sudip Datta  
Major: Business Administration (Finance)  
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
Along with the private equity boom in the mid-2000s emerged a new M&A deal 
technology - the "go-shop" provision. In this paper, I address the question whether go-shop 
provisions are utilized by target managers to pursue private benefits or are used to protect the 
fiduciary interests of the target shareholder. I investigate the effectiveness of go-shop provisions 
by empirically testing two competing hypotheses: (a) the window-dressing hypothesis, and (b) 
the shareholder interest hypothesis.  
This is the first study to shed light on the impact of go-shop provisions on the wealth of 
both the target and the bidder shareholders, and thereby provide evidence on the synergies 
associated with such deal provisions. I also provide evidence on how go-shop provisions affect 
the initial acquirer's bidding behavior, an important issue that has been overlooked in previous 
literature. In addition, this study examines go-shop deal characteristics that are important in 
determining the wealth effect as well as deal outcomes. 
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I document that go-shop deals have higher deal synergies and higher positive wealth 
effect on targets than no-shop deals. Further, although go-shop provisions have no effect on 
bidders’ wealth, they pressure the initial bidders to raise the initial offers to protect the deals. I 
also show that the go-shop deals are more likely to be terminated compared with no-shop deals. 
To address concerns regarding endogeneity and selection bias, I employ Heckman two-stage 
procedure and propensity score matching method to confirm the findings. The go-shop period, 
the number of potential buyers contacted, the number of confidentiality agreements entered, and 
bifurcated termination fee structures are important determinants of deal outcomes. Specifically, 
the market reacts positively to the bifurcated fee structure in go-shop provisions. The number of 
potential buyers contacted and the number of confidentiality agreements entered during the go-
shop period play an important role in pressuring the initial bidder to raise the original offer price, 
while the length of the go-shop period and the number of confidentiality agreements entered 
predict the likelihood of the initial bid success. The findings support the shareholder interest 
theory and suggest that go-shop provisions are an effective market canvas alternative to public 
auctions. 
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